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Abstract 
The final qualifying work contains 156 pages, 31 figures, 22 tables. 
Key words: nuclear facility, nuclear material, physical protection system, 
complex of engineering and technical means of physical protection, physical protection 
engineering and technical equipment, vital zone, limited zone, protected zone, threats, 
vulnerability analysis, nuclear power plant, drones, unmanned aerial vehicles, intruder, 
adversary, hypothetical object, VVER 1000/1200, perimeter. 
The subject of the study are insider threats, outsider threats, insider in collusion 
with outsider threats, nuclear power plant vulnerabilities, analysis of threats that 
unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) impose on nuclear power plant, design of hypothetical 
nuclear facility for VVER NPP, categorization and analysis of the most vulnerable areas 
of this facility, accounting and control of nuclear materials, the design and functions of 
PPS. 
The purpose of the final qualifying work is to design the PPS with the elements of 
the complex of engineering and technical means of physical protection of the inner zone 
and the protected zone (Physical protection system). 
In the course of the work, an analysis was carried out of normative and legal 
documents on the organization and functioning of the physical protection system and the 
system for accounting and control of nuclear materials at the nuclear facility. The 
formulation of requirements for equipping the complex of engineering and technical 
means of physical protection of important and protected areas was also carried out.  
As a result of the work, an integrated physical protection system was designed for 
the protection of nuclear facility from terrorist activities. 
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Introduction 
Nuclear energy is currently the most promising and efficient branch of energy. In 
connection with the development of nuclear power, the number of dangerous fissile 
materials and nuclear equipment is increasing, and the number of countries possessing 
them is also increasing. 
Nuclear materials and nuclear facilities are of great interest to terrorist 
organizations, and as a result, there is a high probability of a terrorist threat, which means 
that nuclear safety and non-proliferation should be widely considered at nuclear facilities. 
The seizure, disabling of nuclear installations or disruption of the operation of such 
facilities is fraught with catastrophic consequences that can cause large and irreparable 
damage to the state, society.  
The number of fissile materials at nuclear facilities is increasing due to the 
accumulation of spent nuclear fuel. In this regard, the attractiveness of nuclear facilities 
from intruders (violators) is increasing. Nuclear materials need a thorough and reliable 
protection of the perimeter, storage and use of nuclear materials. To address these issues, 
there are two main systems. 
Safety of nuclear energy use and security of nuclear materials at nuclear facilities 
is ensured by the State Physical Protection System. The physical protection system is a 
set of organizational and technical measures carried out at a nuclear facility, its 
administration, security service, and security units using engineering and technical means 
of physical protection to prevent unauthorized actions at a nuclear facility. To maintain 
the effective functioning of the physical protection system, it is necessary to update it or 
improve it, as modern terrorists (violators) are sufficiently well trained, aware, armed. 
Therefore, they must be confronted with highly effective protective measures. As 
measures to prevent terrorist attacks, the PPS should jointly perform the functions of 
detection, delay and timely response. 
16 
 
Implementation of these functions is possible only when creating automated 
physical protection systems. An automated system is understood as a set of technical, 
software, other tools and personnel actions designed to automate the security processes of 
an object. Therefore, for the effective functioning of the PPS, staff training, creation and 
application of modern, effective engineering and technical complexes means of physical 
protection that can complement each other must be done. 
There are many systems that perform various security tasks. However, none of 
them is able to guarantee full and reliable protection of objects of and information from 
the full range of possible threats. The solution to this problem lies in the development of 
integrated systems that integrate various security subsystems with common technical 
means, communication channels, software, databases, etc. 
The main advantage of integrated security systems is that all subsystems are 
interconnected, and in response to an event in one subsystem, a corresponding action takes 
place in the other. There is an opportunity to set the required scenarios of reaction of any 
complexity to different events. 
Access control based on biometric readers or cards also helps in increasing the 
security level of the most vulnerable places on the site. At the same time, security is 
provided not by any one element of the system, but by a set of organizational measures 
and technical means of the PPS. To avert or prevent terrorist from unauthorized access to 
limited and vital areas of the organization, it was necessary to design and create a security 
system. 
To solve non-proliferation issues, there is a system of state accounting and control 
of nuclear materials. The system of state accounting and control of nuclear materials is an 
element of the system of state regulation of nuclear energy and is designed to perform 
such important tasks as the maintenance of accounting and reporting documents, and 
prevention of unauthorized actions with respect to nuclear material. 
17 
 
The purpose of this master's thesis is to design a physical protection system for a 
hypothetical object (VVER) in order to address actual threats. To achieve this goal, the 
following tasks were formulated: 
• Analysis of places to build NPP in Ghana. 
• Description of the hypothetical object (VVER 1000/1200)  
• Threats and vulnerability analysis 
• Designing of hypothetical nuclear facility for the VVER 1000/1200 to be 
built in Ghana, categorization and analysis of the most vulnerable areas of this facility.  
• Requirements for equipping PPS with engineering and technical equipment 
within the framework of accounting and control were reviewed. 
• Designation of PPS and equipping the system complex with engineering and 
technical means of physical protection in accordance with the requirements of normative 
documents. 
• The resource, financial, budgetary, social and economic effectiveness of the 
study was carried out. 
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 1 Nuclear energy in Ghana 
1.1 Plans for the implementation of the nuclear program in Ghana 
1.1.1 Brief overview of Ghana 
Ghana became a self-governing nation on 6th March 1957. Ghana practices a 
multiparty system of democracy, based on the 1992 constitution. The country is located 
about 750 km above the equator on the west coast of Africa. It lies between latitudes 4 44’ 
and 11 11’ north and longitudes 3 15’ west and 112’ east. Longitude 0 or the Greenwich 
Meridian passes through the port city of Tema, which is to the east of the country. The 
total area of the country is about 238,540 km. The 2010 Population and Housing Census 
estimated the country’s population at about 24.66 million. The backbone of the country’s 
economy has been the agricultural sector. Ghana’s landscape is drained by a number of 
rivers and streams. The major rivers include the Black Volta, which has its origin in 
Burkina Faso and then flows along the north-western boundary of the country with La 
Cote d’Ivoire, before entering the country at its midsection; the White Volta, which also 
has its origin in Burkina Faso, then flows into the country at the middle of the northern 
boundary; and the Oti River, which flows from Togo and enters the country along the 
northeast of the country. These rivers, flowing from the north, merge at about the middle 
of the country to form the Volta River. There are other rivers in the west, like the Pra, 
Ankobra and Tano rivers, with origins in the highlands of the country. Two hydropower 
plants have been constructed on the Volta River, at Akosombo and Akuse and a third 
hydropower plant at Bui on the Black Volta. There are also a number of coastal lagoons: 
Lake Bosomtwi, created by a meteorite, and the huge manmade Volta Lake, created after 
the construction of the hydroelectric dam at Akosombo.  [1] 
The country has several Airports (International and Local) which include Kotoka 
International Airport, Kumasi and Sunyani Airport. It also has major sea ports which 
comprises of the port of Sekondi-Takoradi, Port of Tema and the fishing harbor at Tema 
through which goods are imported. 
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Ghana’s economy growth decelerated sharply to an estimated 4.2% in 2014, down 
from 7.4% in 2013. Gas supply interruptions from Nigeria, disruptions in power supply, 
rising inflation, and decline of the Cedi were the key drivers of the slowdown. Compared 
to regional countries with similar energy and oil & gas investment opportunities, Ghana 
is well-ranked as an investment location, as a consequence of its long history as a stable 
democracy and an attractive investment climate. With the commissioning of Bui 
hydroelectric plant, Ghana’s total system installed capacity is 2,837 MW, with electricity 
reaching about 74% of the population nationwide. However, the firm or dependable 
capacity would be 2,515 MW. The generation capacity increased in the third quarter of 
2014 by another 240 MW after the commissioning of the Kpone thermal power plant, 
bringing the total installed capacity to 3,077 MW. Expanding Generation capacity, 
extension of the distribution network, reliability of the power supply, reduction of 
technical and commercial losses, and access to natural gas feedstocks are areas of focus 
in the power and energy sectors for the Government of Ghana (GoG) to maintain 
economic growth. Total energy generation, consumption, and peak demand are increasing 
in Ghana due to population and technological advancement. The projected Electricity 
Coincident Peak Demand for the year 2014 was 2,179.5 MW. This represented an increase 
of 236.6 MW and a growth of 12.2% over the 2013 actual peak which was 1,942.9 MW. 
The increase occurred as a result of mines, industrial customers, residential and new loads 
emanating from rural projects. Hydroelectric generation represents about 55% of 
dependable capacity, with the remaining 45% largely made up of thermal generation. 
Solar energy contributes less than half percent of total capacity. The Government of 
Ghana-owned power generation stations are shown in Table 1.1 below. 
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   Table 1.1 - Government of Ghana installed generation capacity 
Facility MW Percentage 
of Capacity 
Type Fuel Type 
Akosombo 1,020 37.5% Hydro Water 
Kpong 160 5.9% Hydro Water 
TAPCO (T1) 330 12.1% Thermal LCO/GAS/DFO 
TICO (T2) 220 8.1% Thermal LCO/GAS/DFP 
T3 132 4.9% Thermal LCO/GAS/DFO 
MRP 80 2.9% Thermal DFO 
Siemens Plant 49 1.8% Thermal Gas/DFO 
Total 1,993 73.3%   
 
   Table 1.2 - Quasi-Independent Power Producers (IPP) 
IPPs MW Percentage of 
Total Capacity 
Type Fuel Type 
BUI Power 400 14.7% Hydro Water 
Sunon Asogli 200 7.4% Thermal Gas 
CENIT 126 4.6% Thermal LCO/Gas 
Total IPPs 726 26%   
TOTAL 
GHANA 
2,719 100%   
 
Reliability of energy supply in Ghana is affected by inadequacy of available 
generation capacities to meet the projected demand under all system conditions. Also, 
poor planning and untimely schedule of maintenance and retrofit upgrades to power plants 
affects the reliability of energy.  Security of fuel supplies such as natural gas supply from 
the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP), Ghana Gas, and adequate stocks of Light Cycle 
Oil (LCO) and Distillate Fuel Oil (DFO), Potential of the WAGP not being able to meet 
contractual quantity of gas, Possible delay in the completion of the Ghana Gas Project and 
Low water level for the hydro power plants are also factors contributing to the unstable 
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energy in the country. This lead to the shedding of minimal power during off peak and 
peak periods as a result of worsening in power supply. Economic development in Ghana 
is constrained by inadequate generation capacity which, in turn, is limited by the 
insufficient supply of natural gas. Estimates by the GoG prepared in 2013, to sustain the 
country’s current rate of economic growth, some 200 MW of additional generation 
capacity will be required per annum over the next 20 years (an additional 4,000 MW).  
Ghana’s electricity market has undergone significant restructuring and reforms, 
including the on-going unbundling of assets and the opportunity for increased private 
sector participation through IPPs. Tariff rates have increased significantly in the past 
years, making them more cost reflective. In an effort to keep pace with inflation, currency 
devaluations (Cedi to the US Dollar), and rising fuel costs, a quarterly adjustment 
mechanism has been put in place beginning January 1, 2014. There are wide opportunities 
for private investment in the energy sector in the form of IPPs and under Feed In Tariffs 
(FITs) for renewable energy projects. The GoG target of 5,000 MW by the end of 2016 
coupled with the estimated requirement of an additional 4,000 MW of capacity over the 
next 20 years, will require significant foreign investment, private capital, and technical 
expertise. The rapid demand for energy over the years necessitate the introduction of 
nuclear power into Ghana’s energy mix as a base load. [2] 
 
1.1.2 Energy sector of Ghana 
Until the discovery of oil and gas in the country, hydropower potential used to be 
the largest indigenous commercial energy resource. It has been estimated that the country 
has about 2,500 MW of hydropower potential, about 60 % of which was exploited by the 
end of 2013. The major exploited hydropower potentials are the 1,020 MW Akosombo 
Hydropower, 160 MW Kpong Hydropower plants on the Volta River and a third 400 MW 
Bui Hydropower plant on the Black Volta. Hydropower systems sometimes suffer from 
low capacity utilization due to perennial droughts. Extreme weather patterns will pose a 
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lot of danger to the development and sustainability of mini and small hydropower 
facilities, as most of them could dry out completely in the dry seasons. Extreme weather 
patterns will pose a lot of danger to the development and sustainability of mini and small 
hydropower facilities, as most of them could dry out completely in the dry seasons [3].  
Other extreme weather conditions which affect hydropower generation include 
observed rise in mean surface temperatures, which has led to increased evaporation of 
water from the 8,500 sq km surface area of the Volta Lake. This results in the loss of high 
volumes of water which could have been used for hydro generation. On the other hand, 
there have been severe rainstorms, especially in the catchment area of the Volta River. 
These rainstorms lead to excessive water inflows in the Volta Lake, which tend to threaten 
the safety of the dam. In November 2010, the Volta River Authority was forced to spill 
water from the dam when the water level in the reservoir reached a height of 277.1 ft (the 
maximum height is 278 ft). 
The development of renewable energy sources like wind, solar and biomass-based 
electricity generation, which depend so much on weather patterns, could also be 
threatened by climate change and by extreme weather variability. 
The country’s domestic energy resources are crude oil, natural gas, hydropower, 
and other renewable energy sources like wind, solar and traditional biomass. [4] 
 
1.1.3 Electricity policy and decision-making process 
The main policies that govern the electricity sector are formulated by the Ministry 
of Energy. The Ministry is also responsible for the monitoring and evaluating of policies, 
programmes and projects in the electricity sector. The Energy Commission, a quasi-
independent body established by the Energy Commission Act 1997 (Act 541), is the 
government’s energy policy advisor and makes national energy policy recommendations 
to the Minister of Energy. The Commission advises the Minister of Energy on national 
energy policies for the efficient, economic and safe supply of electricity and natural gas, 
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having due regard for the economy. In addition, the Commission is to formulate national 
policies for the development and utilization of indigenous energy resources, in particular 
renewable energy: solar, wind and biomass. 
The planning of the electricity sector system is the responsibility of the Energy 
Commission. The Commission has been given the mandate to prepare, review and 
periodically update indicative national energy plans, to ensure that all reasonable demands 
for energy are met. The Commission has undertaken the Strategic National Energy Plan 
(2006-2020) and Planning for Sustainable Energy Development – Ghana Country Study 
(2004-2030) studies and is currently in the process to Updating the Strategic National 
Energy Plan. The Energy Commission and the Ghana Grid Company have also undertaken 
a Generation Master Plan Study for Ghana. 
Two power system planning studies have taken place in the recent past. The 
Energy Commission and other stakeholders under the IAEA National TC project 
GHA/0/008 undertook “Planning for Sustainable Energy Development – Ghana Country 
Study”. The other study, “Generation Master-plan Study for Ghana”, was undertaken by 
Tractebel Engineering on behalf of Energy Commission and GRIDCo Ltd. These two 
studies were based on Bui Hydropower plant coming online in 2013, the use of natural 
gas from Nigeria imported through the West African Gas Pipeline, and domestic Jubilee 
Fields for electricity generation. Actual, proposed and generating master plan for 
sustainable energy was estimated and shown in figure 1.1 below. 
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Figure 1.1 – Actual and Projected Electricity Generation Capacity 
 
 
Figure 1.2 – Structure of Ghana Electricity System 
 
Figure 1.2 shows the hierarchical order of decision making and planning of the 
energy sector from the ministry of energy till final consumers. 
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1.1.4 Current organizational chart 
The organizational structure envisaged for the implementation of the country’s 
nuclear power programme and the relationships between the various stakeholders.  
 
Figure 1.3- Working Groups to undertake various aspects of TCP GHA/0/011 
 
Figure 1.4- Organizational chart of Ghana 
 
The Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC) is expected to play a leadership 
role in the implementation of the country’s nuclear power programme. The Commission 
has established four institutes and a school. And now, the Nuclear Power Institute has 
been established to initiate and monitor day to day progress of the procedures to obtain a 
nuclear power plant. The institutes are the Radiation Protection Institute (RPI), 
Biotechnology and Nuclear Agriculture Research Institute (BNARI), Radiological and 
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Medical Research Institute (RAMSRI) and National Nuclear Research Institute (NNRI). 
They are intended to research into peaceful and safe applications of nuclear energy, 
science and technology, and biotechnology, in sectors such as agriculture, energy, 
environment, geology, health and industry. The Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, 
acting on behalf of the government, submitted a proposal to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency for support in undertaking a study to evaluate the role nuclear power will 
play in the country’s future electricity generation.  
 
1.1.5 National Laws and Regulations 
The Ghana Atomic Energy Commission and stakeholders, with assistance from 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, have drafted the Ghana Nuclear Energy Bill, 
2009 to pave the way for peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Ghana. The Bill, which has 
been submitted to the Cabinet for consideration before being laid before Parliament, 
proposes the establishment of Ghana Nuclear Regulatory Authority. The Ghana Nuclear 
Energy Bill presented to parliament include the following; Introductory Provisions, The 
Ghana Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Regulatory Activities, Provisions for Reactors, 
Transportation of Nuclear Materials, Safeguards and Prohibitions, Provisions on Mining 
and Processing, Provisions on Nuclear Liability, Inspection and Enforcements, Offences, 
Penalties and Appeals, General Provisions. The bill was considered by cabinet and 
approved by parliament. 
In 1993, the Provisional National Defence Council Law 308 established a twelve-
member Radiation Protection Board and issued concurrently a Legislative Instrument LI 
1559, which prescribed the mandate and responsibilities of the Board as a licensing and 
regulatory Authority for the purpose of Radiation Protection and Waste Safety. Hence, to 
facilitate the mandate of the Board, the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, in pursuit of 
Ghana Atomic Energy Commission Act, 2000: Act 588, established the Radiation 
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Protection Institute (RPI) in February 2002. The organizational chart of the Radiation 
Protection institute is shown below. 
 
 
Figure 1.5- Structure of Radiation Protection Institute (under the Radiation 
Protection Board, now Ghana Nuclear Regulatory Authority) 
 
The Radiation Protection Board issues licenses to persons who purchase, 
manufacture, acquire imports, sell or deal in, store, use, dispose of or export, any kind of 
irradiating device or radioactive material, or any other source of ionizing radiation. The 
Ghana Nuclear Power Programme Organization (GNPPO) is an organization mandated 
with the task of coordinating, overseeing and administering the phase-to-phase 
implementation of the Nuclear Power Programme in Ghana until the commissioning of 
Ghana’s first nuclear power plant. 
Ghana's Power Ministry and ROSATAM have signed an agreement for 
cooperation in peaceful use of the nuclear energy in the Republic of Ghana. The document 
of the agreement signed between Russia's ROSATOM and Ghana's Ministry for Energy 
and Petroleum establishes legal framework for cooperation in the field of peaceful 
application of atomic energy between the two countries. The two sides plan to jointly 
develop atomic energy infrastructure, and also, the plan is to construct reactors, including 
research reactor facilities in the Republic of Ghana. This is a framework agreement. Being 
signed, the document allows for development of the necessary contractual and legal 
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framework for cooperation in the nuclear area between Russian Federation and Republic 
of Ghana. Within the agreement, the parties are intended to develop cooperation in design 
and construction of power and research nuclear reactors; exploration and production of 
uranium deposits; nuclear fuel cycle services; production of radioisotopes and their 
application in industry, medicine and agriculture; education, training and retraining of 
experts for the nuclear energy industry.  
  
 1.1.6 Nuclear power development strategy 
The country was awarded a national TCP GHA/0/011: “Evaluating the role of 
nuclear power in Ghana’s future electricity generation mix”. The successful 
implementation of the IAEA TCP GHA/0/011: “Evaluating the role of nuclear power in 
Ghana’s future electricity generation mix” is expected to present the framework for 
developing the country’s nuclear power development strategy. A Nuclear Energy 
Programme Implementation Organization has been established to manage the activities of 
seven working groups. The seven working groups will address issues with regards to the 
following: 
1. Siting Grid Infrastructure Assessment 
This working group is expected to undertake a series of studies to develop a 
strategy for the determination of potential sites, evaluation of these sites for 
characterization, and final determination. It will also assess the national grid and its 
interconnection with the West African Power Pool and develop a strategy for nuclear 
power operation suitable for the national grid or in the context of the West African Power 
Pool. A preliminary potential site mapping has been undertaken as part of the 
implementation of IAEA national TCP GHA/0/011: “Evaluating the role of nuclear power 
in Ghana’s future electricity generation mix”. The working group dealing with siting 
issues is expected to undertake further assessment of the sites that have been mapped out 
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for characterization, to determine such factors as source of cooling water, transport and 
grid infrastructure, for the ranking of the nuclear power plant site. 
2. Techno-economic Assessment, Financing and Procurement 
This working group is expected to review future electricity generation expansion 
plans to determine the role of nuclear power and undertake a comprehensive techno-
economic assessment of these plans. The group is also expected to develop a strategy for 
funding the nuclear power programme, long-term spent fuel handling and final disposal, 
waste management and decommissioning of the nuclear power plant. The government is 
funding all activities related to the implementation of the nuclear power programme. The 
Techno-economic Assessment, Financing and Procurement working groups are expected 
to develop a strategy for funding the nuclear power project. 
3. Legal and Regulatory Issues 
This working group will address all legal and regulatory issues pertaining to the 
country’s nuclear power programme. A Nuclear Bill has been drafted, which proposed the 
establishment of a Nuclear Regulatory Authority to be in charge of licensing nuclear 
power plants and all nuclear related facilities and in charge of undertaking nuclear 
regulatory activities. The Bill has been submitted to Cabinet, it was approved and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Authority was established. 
 
4. Technology Assessment 
This group is expected to undertake the assessment of specific technologies 
suitable to be adopted for the country’s nuclear power project for electricity supply and 
for a policy for nuclear fuel acquisition. It is also expected to develop a strategy for 
management of the various levels of nuclear waste. 
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5. Human Resource Development 
This working group is expected to undertake assessment of human resource 
requirements at all stages of the nuclear power programme, and to develop a strategy for 
human resource development. 
 
6. Nuclear Power Project Management 
This working group is expected to develop the nuclear power project framework, 
activities and time scales. It is also expected to develop best strategy or type of contract 
for securing a nuclear power plant e.g. turnkey, split package or multi packages. 
7. Stakeholder Involvement 
This working group is expected to develop a comprehensive Communication 
Strategy for public awareness campaigns and for ensuring the involvement of all 
stakeholders. [5] 
 
1.1.7 Developing a National Position towards a Nuclear Power Plant  
A national position is the outcome of a process that establishes the governmental 
strategy and commitment to develop, implement and maintain a safe, secure and 
sustainable nuclear power programme [6]. This process results in a national decision that 
clearly communicates the Country’s national policy, as well as its commitments in 
accordance with all international obligations, norms and standards.  
 
1.1.8 Conditions required for national position in phase one  
In line with the IAEA milestone approach for the development of nuclear 
infrastructure, a newcomer country can be considered to have satisfied national position 
requirements when the following are met. 
When a long-term commitment and the importance of nuclear safety, security and 
non-proliferation have been duly recognised. This condition is demonstrated with a clear 
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statement by government of its intent to develop a nuclear power programme with a strong 
commitment to safety, security and non-proliferation [7].  
A nuclear energy programme implementation organisation is established and 
staffed: with a clear mandate to see to the development of the programme; be recognised 
by all relevant ministries as having that role; report to a senior minister or directly to the 
head of government; have the required funding, resources and expertise, and involve all 
relevant stakeholders, including the country’s major utilities, the regulatory body for 
security and radiation safety, relevant government agencies, decision makers.  
A national nuclear energy strategy has been defined. This defines and justifies the 
national strategy for the role of nuclear power in a country’s energy mix. Among others, 
this may include: an analysis of energy demand and energy alternatives; an evaluation of 
the impacts of nuclear power on the national economy, e.g. GDP and employment; a 
preliminary technology assessment to identify technologies that are consistent with 
national expectations consideration of siting possibilities and grid capacity; consideration 
of financing options, ownership options and operator responsibilities; consideration of 
long-term costs and obligations relating to spent fuel, radioactive waste and 
decommissioning, and considerations of the human resource needs and external support 
needs of the regulatory body and owner/operator [8]. 
Currently, Ghana has a nuclear power plant program going on and has attained 
success in all the nineteen (19) infrastructural issues to be considered prior to the 
commencement of the operation of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). 
This shows a completeness of the first of the three phases of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandatory milestone approaches for every newcomer 
state to accomplish before the development of a national infrastructure for nuclear power. 
[9] In February 2018, the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation 
(MESTI), through the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC), under the Nuclear 
Power Project, signed a Memorandum of Agreement with ROSATOM for the 
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construction of a Nuclear Power Plant which will have the Russian design VVER-
1000/1200 power units in Ghana. [10] 
 
1.1.9 Hypothetical nuclear facility in Ghana 
1.2 General siting considerations 
A good site for a nuclear power plant should diminish the plant’s impact on the 
environment. The site should be in such a way that the amount of radioactive releases to 
the public are minimal in case of an accident. A great amount of heat released to the 
environment should have small effect on aquatic life, or, if cooling towers are used, their 
consequence on the micro-climate must be within acceptable limits. The characteristics of 
the site which include population distribution, meteorology, hydrology, should be such 
that the effects of accidents are within tolerable limits (IAEA 1982). 
The main conditions that need to be considered when selecting a site for nuclear 
power plant includes seismology, geology, hydrology and grid infrastructure. Since most 
available reactors are cooled by water, they have to be built close to a large water body. 
The quantity of water needed depends on the type of a cooling system to be used, that is, 
whether it is a once through type or recirculation with cooling towers or cooling ponds. A 
plant of 1000MW may need a water coolant flow rate of approximately 100 m3/s (IAEA 
1982). If recirculation is used, make-up water of 2%-5% is needed. Additional significant 
factor to watch out for in the site’s search is ground shaking during earthquake. In 
principle, nuclear reactors have to be designed in such a way that it would be able to 
withstand any ground shaking intensity, if the subsurface material is suitable. Seismic 
designs which are above ground shaking with the peak ground acceleration of 0.2 g where 
g is acceleration due to gravity are, somehow expensive with the cost increasing more 
than linearly with intensity. Shown in the figure below are the relationship between the 
ground shaking intensity for plant safe shutdown and the percentage of plant cost in the 
Africa. The closeness of population to a nuclear plant site is another factor to be 
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considered. There is a general principle controlling the population distribution around a 
nuclear facility and is such that it will allow a feasible emergency plan to move individuals 
away from areas that has been affected in case of an accident. Shown below is a map of 
showing the earth zones of Africa. 
 
 
Figure 1.6- Earthquake intensity zones of Africa. 
 
An area called an exclusion zone is therefore set around the reactor’s facility, 
where there is restriction to public access. Also, there is no permitting of permanent 
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residence in the exclusion area. Several factors determine the size of the exclusion zone 
and differs from country to country. 
For example, in the U.S, the size of the exclusion area is designed in such a way 
that an individual, situated at any point on its boundary for about two hours immediately 
following the onset of assumed fission product release, would not receive an accumulated 
radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem, that is, 0.25 Sieverts or an 
accumulated radiation dose in excess of 300 rem, that is, 3 Sieverts to the thyroid from 
exposure to iodine (US NRC 2012). In several countries, the exclusion zone around a 
nuclear power plant is about 0.5 kilometer to 1 kilometers and may even be more in some 
other countries (IAEA 1982). 
The Possibility of life-threatening natural events such as flooding, volcanic 
eruption, and earthquakes are also considered in the process of site selection. The main 
phenomenon which is of major worry in the case of earthquake is surface faulting. It is 
the displacement of the ground during severe earthquakes caused by the faults that created 
the earthquake (capable faults). This kind of displacement may reach several meters. As 
it is very difficult and challenging task to design plants against such a phenomenon, the 
ultimate solution is to situate the plants far away from the fault. Furthermore, plants have 
to be situated far away from areas which are prone to volcanic eruptions as a result of the 
emission of lava flows and burning clouds. It also has to be protected from static and 
dynamic effects of flooding. Therefore, in principle, it is necessary not to situate plants in 
areas or zones where flooding is severe. Building of Nuclear power plants along rivers 
and other waterbodies have to be protected against flooding due to precipitation and other 
forms of actions such as failure of water controlling structures such as dam collapse. 
Nuclear power Plants along the coast have to be protected against tsunamis, surges, and 
wind induced waves. The subject of flooding has led to world-wide attention as a result 
of the Fukushima accident that occurred in March, 2011, when a 14-m tsunami wave 
swept through a nuclear plant site in Fukushima in Japan damaging and destroying 
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emergency generators and pumps. This resulted in the loss of the coolant flow leading to 
the partial melting of fuel rods (IAEA 2011). Adding up to the natural phenomena, 
nearness to installations that can handle military installations, aircraft flight paths, 
explosions etc., must also be taken into consideration. Nearness to existing grid network 
load centers is also a factor to be put into consideration when looking for a site. The 
purpose of this is to minimize electricity transmission losses and, consequently, 
transmission cost. There have been overwhelming earthquakes recorded in 1862 and 1939. 
Both of these earthquakes with magnitudes of 6.5 created immense destruction in Accra, 
the capital city of Ghana. The 1939 earthquake resulted in 17 fatalities and 133 injuries. 
The computed peak ground acceleration ranges from 0.14g to 0.57g corresponding to VII 
to IX on the modified Mercalli scale. The history of earthquake in Ghana is given in the 
Table below. Several fault lines are present within the major earthquake zones of Ghana. 
These comprises of the Eastern Boundary fault, Akwapim fault, the Coastal Boundary 
fault, and Western Boundary fault. 
  Table 1.3- Peak ground acceleration collated with intensity scales 
PGA(g) MODIFIED 
MERCALLI 
INTENSITY 
> 0.025 > = IV > =IV 
0.025 V V 
0.05 VI VI 
0.10 VII VII 
0.20 VIII VIII 
0.40 IX IX 
> 40 X X 
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  Table 1.4- History of earthquake events in Ghana 
Year Magnitude Remarks 
1615 - Felt in Elmina 
1636 5.7 Felt in Axim. Buildings as well underground workings of 
Portuguese mines collapsed 
1862 6.5 Every building in Accra was razed to the ground. The 
OsuCastle and Forts were rendered uninhabitable. The shocks 
were felt in Togo where water in the Mono river fell much 
below its normal level. 
1906 5.0 Many buildings in Accra particularly castles and forts were 
cracked. The earthquake was felt in other areas as far as Togo 
1939 6.5 Intensity was greatest in areas between Accra, Weija, Gomoa 
Fete, and Nyanyanu. The computed peak ground acceleration 
ranges from 0.14g to 0.57g corresponding to VII and IX on the 
modified mercali scale. In Accra 16 people were Killed with 
133 injuries 
1964 4.5 Felt mainly in Akosombo 
1969 4.7 Felt mainly in Accra 
1997 3.8 Felt mainly in Accra 
2003 4.8 Felt in some parts of Accra 
 
With respect to drainage, there are a number of rivers in Ghana, most of which 
flow into the sea in the south. This comprises of the Pra, the Ankobra, and the Tano. It 
also has an artificial lake that is the Volta Lake which was formed as a result of the creation 
of the first hydro-electric dam on the river Volta. The water volume of this lake is 187 
km3 and with a total surface area of 8500 km2. This surface area makes it the biggest man-
made lake in the world. The country also has a 539-km coastline as its southern boundary. 
The likelihood of existence of tsunamis in Ghana was out for discussion due to the 
Fukushima accident, which took place in Japan in the month of March, 2011. So many 
experts are of the view that the likelihood of existence of such kind of event in the 
Ghanaian seas, which are part of the Atlantic Ocean, is remote. 
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1.2.1 Geographical features of Ghana 
Though Ghana is distant away from the major earthquake sectors in Africa and 
some parts of the world, it is slightly seismically active along its coast in the south. The 
figure below shows the Earthquake epicenters. As shown in Figure, the intensities of 
earthquake generally range from level V to VI on the modified Mercalli scale. This is 
similar to the peak ground acceleration of 0.05g to 0.1g using the conversion given in 
Table 1 above. The country “Ghana” has some earthquake data for investigation to a 
reasonable degree. 
 
 
Figure 1.7- Fault map of the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area. 
The process involved in the selection of sites consist of several activities which 
can be divided into two main stages. These include site survey and site qualification. Site 
survey comprises the universal studies of the whole country to identify suitable sites. The 
sites identified which are selected are then subjected to systematic analysis to make sure 
that they meet at a substantial level for the laid down characteristics involved in selecting 
suitable sites during the site qualification stage. The work in the siting process in Ghana 
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is the site survey stage, where lands nearer to water bodies inland and coastal areas are 
being screened to become possible sites for the construction of nuclear power plant. 
 
 
Figure 1.8- Population Density of Ghana 
Bearing in mind the country’s seismicity and related fault lines, areas around the 
eastern part of the Akwapim fault are considered inappropriate. These comprises of Accra 
and its surrounding areas. Locations around the Volta Lake are considered to be attractive 
as a result of their low seismicity and population density.  The siting of a nuclear power 
plant along the Lake Volta has, raised discussions and arguments among stake holders. 
The main reason being that, since the lake is a fresh water body, it will be contaminated 
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by radioactive substances in case an accident occurs and will lead to the creation of serious 
environmental issues or problems. This opinion has also been opposed by the fact that, 
there is a likelihood of Burkina Faso deciding to build a nuclear power plant in the near 
future and if this happens, it will certainly be built in the Volta basin due to fact that it is 
a land locked country and has no large rivers. The subject of pollution also arises in this 
situation in case of an accident. However, the universal view between national planners 
and environmentalists is that the fresh water bodies require protection, hence any effort 
and decisions made to situate nuclear power plants around fresh water bodies have a 
probability to meet stiff disagreement. The situation of reactor or nuclear plant sites 
around water bodies will also be rejected since they are also fresh waters. Moreover, there 
has to be the assurance that the rivers or water bodies will not dry up due to periodic 
droughts during the working life of the nuclear power plants. 
Most of the nuclear power plants existing in several countries are licensed to 
function for 40 years, and a number of them have received extra time to work for further 
20 years. This means that there should be no drying up of water bodies or rivers within 
the expected 60-years functional life time of the plant. With regard to the effects of climate 
changes, the immense losses of water in rivers is very possible. Several studies have 
revealed that a lot of rivers in Ghana will lose about (30 % to 40 %) of water by 2050 as 
a result of climate change. Accumulating all these features together, location of site has 
been limited to areas or zones around the west coast of the Akwapim fault. The zone, 
which lies in the middle of 0o 23’west and 3o 06’west, is being screened to obtain candidate 
sites. The activities to be considered during the conduction and screening process include 
detail seismic studies and analysis, meteorology, population distribution, social issues, 
protection of historical artefacts, and land acquisition issues. [11] 
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Figure 1.9- Drainage map of Ghana. [12] 
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Figure 1.10- Ghana flood relief [13] 
From the figure 1.10, it indicates that the upper half of the country suffers from 
flood sometimes in the rainy season. This is due to the opening of some dam gates in the 
upper neighboring country called Burkina Faso. Therefore, it wouldn’t be advisable to site 
a nuclear reactor close to Burkina Faso and the Northern part of the country. 
 
 
Figure 1.11- Hurricanes, typhoon and cyclonic view of Africa. [14] 
 
42 
 
Also, from figure 1.11, it confirms absolutely that Africa in general is free from 
violent natural disasters such as the hurricanes, typhoons and the cyclones. Hence Ghana 
as a country is free from these disasters. 
 
1.2.2 Considerable site for NPP unit types in Ghana 
 
Figure 1.12- A hypothetical site selected for the construction of nuclear power 
plant in Ghana. 
The figure 1.12 is a hypothesized choice of area and sites selected for the proposed 
nuclear power plant to be constructed in Ghana upon successfully consideration of all 
safety measures regarding site selection such as meteorological, seismology, hydrology 
etc. These factors have been carefully studied before considering Kpong as the appropriate 
choice of the site. The population density of this area is less and it is also close to a river. 
The area is also free from surface faults. From the figure, it is clear that the potential sites 
for the nuclear power plant are 50 km from the Kpong township. However, roads and 
railway will be constructed to reach the selected site for smooth transportation of materials 
and engineering machines to the selected area.  
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Figure 1.13- Map of Ghana showing Kpong 
 
1.2.3 Analysis of Corruption, Theft and Terrorism in Ghana  
The country “Ghana” has for the past years been experiencing corruption and 
dangerous armed robbery of all kinds. These armed robbers who make use of sophisticated 
weapons have become so brave that they even operate in broad daylight, demonstrating 
total disregard for the police or the other law enforcement agencies in Ghana. 
There have been many instances where Ghanaian residents abroad who have 
returned home for holidays or to invest their monies have been targeted and robbed. A 
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disturbing phenomenon of their activities is carjacking and highway robbery previously 
unknown in Ghana. Armed robbers boldly snatch cars from their owners, waylay traders 
on the highways and rob them of their monies and personal belongings. In some cases, 
they even murder their victims in cold blood and many others. 
Ghana, which used to be the most peaceful country in West Africa, is now getting 
a bad name as a result of the actions of these armed robbers. The doings of these armed 
robbers have left many Ghanaians to live in fear. [15] 
Furthermore, Ghanaian leaders and the people themselves are so corrupt that they 
can do anything to earn quick money without working for it. For example, in Ghana, 
policemen and custom officers take bribes from people and make them occupy positions 
which they are not qualified for all because of their selfish gain and the love of money 
which has now made the country to earn a bad name because of the corrupt nature of its 
citizens. 
Also, the U.S. department of state has assessed Accra as being a medium-threat 
location for terrorist activity directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. 
Though there exists an increasing threat of terrorism, Ghana has been spared a 
direct terrorist attack, but it does remain vulnerable due to porous borders and regional 
instability. [16] Nevertheless, Ghana is at a higher risk of experiencing Terrorism in the 
near future due to the presence of the “Boko Haram” group in Nigeria which is a 
neighboring country to Ghana.  
Boko Haram begun as an Islamic anti-corruption group that became a violent, IS-
affiliated movement whose rebellion has threatened stability in the Lake Chad region. 
Boko Haram, whose name loosely translates from the Hausa language as “Western 
education is forbidden”, aims to create a hardline Islamic state in northeast Nigeria. Its 
rebellion has cost at least 20,000 lives since 2009. 
Boko Haram was very peaceful before its leader “Mohammed Yusuf” was killed 
in custody in 2009 by the Nigerian police after an uprising in Maiduguri, which prompted 
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a military assault which led to the killing of some 700 people and left the group’s mosque 
and headquarters in wrecks. 
Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s right-hand man, replaced him as leader, and begun to 
wage masses of deadly attacks on schools, mosques, churches, state entities and security 
services. Among the group’s most notorious acts was the April 2014 kidnapping of more 
than 200 school girls from the remote town of Chibok. 
A total of 106 have since been released, found or escaped: 113 remain captive. 
The mass kidnapping brought world attention to the insurgency at a time when 
Boko Haram was seizing territory across the northeast, threatening Nigerian sovereignty. 
Eight years of violence have forced 2.6 million from their homes, destroying 
property and farmland in the mainly rural northeast, sparking a humanitarian crisis and 
acute food shortages. 
Several thousands of people have lived under the threat of scarcity of food and are 
reliant on aid agencies for food, water, shelter and healthcare. [17] 
Therefore, looking at these scenarios, since these two countries are neighbors, if 
should in case the “Boko Haram” group makes any attack on a nuclear facility in Nigeria, 
it may lead to the release of radiations or loss of radioactive material which will lead to 
mass destruction in some part of Nigeria and might also go a long way in affecting some 
surrounding areas in Ghana.  
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Figure 1.14- Map showing Areas of Boko Haram terrorist attack in Nigeria 
 
Figure 1.15- Map of Africa showing the closeness of Ghana and Nigeria 
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1.2.4 Description of the hypothetical object to be constructed in Ghana 
The country has agreed on constructing a pressurized water reactor (VVER–
1000/1200). The VVER-1200 is a Generation 3+ with V–491 reactor plant which is a 
development of the VVER–1000 design which uses light water as coolant and moderator 
reactor and has proved a long-time operation. The comprehensive realization of the NPP 
safety is achieved through the principle of defense-in-depth which is based on the 
application of a system of barriers in the way to the possible circulation of the radioactive 
substances and ionizing radiation into the atmosphere and the surrounding environment 
as well as on the application of a system of the engineered safety features and 
organizational measures to ensure the integrity of these barriers. The reactor consists of 
121 rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs) and are positioned inside the core as 
compared to 41–61 in other PWRs. They are designed for quick chain reaction 
suppression, maintaining power at given level and its level-to-level transition, axial power 
field leveling, xenon oscillation suppression. The material for the construction of the 
reactor is an alloy of Steel with compositions 15H2NMFA. The frequency of core damage 
is less than 1.000*10-6 /Reactor–Year and an occupational radiation exposure less than 
0.39 Person–Sv/RY. [18] 
VVER is a thermal neutron reactor with pressurized water as both coolant and 
moderator. It has a two-circuit steam generating system with four cooling loops, main 
circulation pump, pressurizer, relief and emergency valves on steam pipes, and 
accumulator tanks of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). Hence, VVER-1200 
has a reliability of time-proven engineering solutions with a set of active and passive 
safety systems compliant with post-Fukushima requirements. 
The presence of spent fuel pool inside the containment, inter-containment space 
ventilation filters, a core catcher with a sacrificial concrete layer, an unparalleled passive 
heat removal system, and other cutting-edge technologies merged into VVER-1200 design 
certainly makes it a Generation 3+ reactor. The ECCS also features innovative 
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technologies, and one of them is cold boric acid which is stored under pressure in special 
tanks. In case of containment or pipeline rupture, valves open and boric acid is injected 
into the reactor core to bring the chain reaction to a stop and cool down the reactor. ECCS 
in combination with other systems assures an extreme degree of the reactor safety. [19] 
 
 
Figure 1.2.1- Diagram of VVER nuclear power plant [20] 
 
 
Figure 1.2.2- VVER Plant Layout  
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1. Reactor building Unit 1 
2. Reactor building Unit 2 
3. Steel containment 
4. Polar crane, 250 tons 
5. Ice condenser 
6. Refueling machine 
7. Reactor pressure vessel 
8. Control rod drives 
9. Primary circuit (6 loops) 
10. Main circulation pump 
11. Main shut-off valve 
12. Steam generator 
13. Tank area 
14. Laboratory building 
15. Computer room 
16. Main control room 
17. Turbo-generators 
18. Moisture separator-reheater 
19. Condensate purification plant 
 
20. Two turbine hall   
21. Office building 
22. Demineralization plant 
23. Cooling water pumping plant Unit 
one (1) 
24. Main coolant pump 
25. Demineralized water tanks 
26. Drain tank of secondary circuit 
27. Switchyard 
28. Cooling water pumping plant Unit 
two (2) 
29. Service building 
30. Ventilation stack 
31. Auxiliary building Unit 1 
32. Auxiliary building Unit 2 
33. Exhaust air conditioning center 
34. Evaporators of active water 
treatment plant 
35. Machine repair shop 
36. Liquid waste storage [21] 
 
1.2.5 Reactor core and fuel design 
The reactor core comprises of 163 fuel assemblies which are identical in design, 
but different in the enrichment of fuel. The TVSA fuel assembly (FA) is taken as a base 
version of fuel assembly design and as an alternative version which is TVS-2. Both 
versions of FA are interchangeable and are of reference character. The design of the core 
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is developed for the generalized version of FA design both TVSA and TVS-2 providing 
its operability in using several FA types. Both FA designs comprises of the following 
components which are top nozzle; bundles of fuel rods (fuel rods and Gd fuel rods); 
bottom nozzle. FA top nozzle provides necessary force of FA compression in the core. 
There is a skeleton for the bundle of fuel rods and it houses 312 fuel rods (Gd fuel rods). 
The skeleton comprises of guiding channels and spacing grids and provides the following 
throughout the FA service life. 
The FA bottom nozzle offers conjugation of FA lower part with the support of the 
reactor core barrel and presents a guiding device for coolant supply into fuel rod bundles 
and Gd fuel rods. Below are images showing the general views of the TVSA and TVS-2. 
 
Figure 1.2.3- TVSA and TVS-2 VVER fuel Assembly designs 
 
The rod control cluster assembly (RCCA) comprises of 18 absorbing elements 
(AEs), the grip head and springs of an individual suspender. 
The RCCA AE is a tube of outer diameter 8.2×10-3m and wall thickness 0.5×10-
3m which is filled with absorbing material and sealed with end pieces by means of 
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welding. The absorbing material used are Boron carbide B4C and dysprosium titanate 
(Dy2O3 TiO2). Dysprosium titanate in the AE lower part permits to extend RCCA service 
life under maintenance of sufficient worth of emergency protection. The basic 
characteristics of the equilibrium fuel cycle are given in the table below. 
 Table 1.5- Main characteristics or parameters of the equilibrium fuel cycle 
Characteristic Value 
Number of loaded fresh FA, pcs. 
- total 
42 
Average enrichment of make-up fuel in 
U235, % wt. 
4.45 
Duration of reactor operation between 
refueling, effective days. 
325 
Burn-up of unloaded fuel, MWD/kg U: 52.8 
 
1.2.6 Fuel handling systems 
The complex of systems used for refueling and nuclear fuel storage represents a 
set of systems, devices, components intended for storage, loading, unloading, 
transportation and the inspection of nuclear fuel. This systems for refueling and fuel 
storage provides: 
• Receiving, storage and incoming inspection of a fresh nuclear fuel before 
loading into the reactor 
• Nuclear fuel reloading in the reactor core 
• Storage of spent nuclear fuel in spent fuel pool of NPP reactor building 
• A long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel in the storehouse at NPP site 
• On-site transportation of nuclear fuel on NPP territory starting from receiving 
a special transport with fresh fuel and finishing with a long-term storage of spent nuclear 
fuel in SNFS (spent nuclear fuel storehouse). [22] 
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Figure 1.2.4- Nuclear reactor and Primary circuit of VVER-1200 plant [23] 
 
1.2.7 VVER-1000/1200 reactor fuel, fuel rods and fuel assembly 
Both VVER-1000/1200 uses bundles fuel rods with zirconium-alloy as claddings 
material. These bundles of fuel rods are filled with fuel pellets of uranium dioxide. In 
some cases, the fuel rods are filled with pellets containing gadolinium oxide to improve 
upon its physical characteristics and safety. The VVER fuel Assembly has hexagonal 
design. 
Besides fuel rods, fuel assembly has a number of structural elements: cap, 
tailpiece, spacing grids and in some cases a shroud tube. A cap is designed for gripping 
during load-unloading operations, and a tailpiece ensures the FA placement in to the 
reactor and provides channel for coolant for fuel rods. 
A VVER-440 FA is composed of 126 fuel rods. A VVER-1000 FA has 311-312 
fuel rods. There are different modifications of fuel for this type of reactors, designed for 
3, 4, or 5-year fuel cycles.  
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At present, two designs of fuel assemblies for VVER-1000 reactors – TVSA and 
TVS-2 - with a higher rigidity skeleton. This strengthened skeleton is the key feature of 
the fuel assemblies. In TVSA it is formed by spacers and 6 angles joined by spot welding 
that provide higher rigidity and strength of the structures. In TVS-2 the skeleton is formed 
by spacers spot-welded to guides to provide more rigid and strong structure.  
Depending on fuel pellet material, uranium fuel rods and gadolinium fuel rods are 
distinguished. The former use uranium dioxide (UO2) and the latter are fitted also with an 
integrated burnable poison – gadolinium oxide (Gd2O3).  
There are makes of VVER-440 and VVER-1000 reactor fuel assemblies which are 
different in a uranium-235 and gadolinium oxide content in the said fuel rods, which are 
designed for four- and five-year operating cycles. [24] 
 
 
Figure 1.2.5- VVER fuel Assembly [25] 
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Figure 1.2.6- VVER Reactor Vessel [26] 
 
1.2.8 General criteria for designing of nuclear fuel 
• In the determination of the criteria for designing of nuclear fuel, the 
properties which include physical, chemical and mechanical phenomena that affect the 
strength or durability of the nuclear fuel during functional and accidental conditions will 
be broadly evaluated. The evaluation will cover all design basis scenarios. 
• In the determination of the criteria for designing of nuclear fuel, the material 
and structural properties that are related to final disposal and the long-term safety of final 
disposal will also be considered. 
• The designing of a nuclear fuel assembly shall be done in such a way that its 
components maintain their position in all functional conditions and that they are not 
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permanently removed during postulated accidents. The nuclear fuel assembly must 
withstand all design-basis scenario loads in such a way that reactor shutdown and 
coolability are not endangered. 
• Irradiation-induced changes that affect the properties of the nuclear fuel will 
be taken into consideration in the determination of the limits for safe use of the nuclear 
fuel, including the effects on the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Burn-up limits to be 
applied to nuclear fuel shall be presented, and they shall be based on experimental data. If 
irradiation affects heat transfer between cladding and coolant it shall be taken into account 
also in correlations used for evaluating the heat transfer crisis. 
• Control rods shall withstand wear and other stresses during operation in order 
that their normal function is not endangered. The control rods will retain their capability 
to absorb neutrons when the reactor is in operation in compliance with the assumptions of 
the Safety Analysis Report of the plant unit. 
• The normal functional process of control rods must not be prevented by 
distortions of a fuel rods or fuel assembly. 
 
1.2.9 Criteria for designing of nuclear fuel for normal operational conditions 
In normal operational conditions, the fuel shall accomplish the following 
conditions: 
• There will be no melting in the fuel pellets. 
• The Cladding temperature will not significantly exceed the temperature of 
coolant. 
• There will be no collapsing of fuel rod cladding. 
• The fuel rod internal pressure will not rise to the level that the deformations 
of the cladding caused by it would negatively affect the heat transfer between fuel pellets 
and coolant (lift-off). 
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The deformations in the control rod and fuel assembly components or parts shall 
remain so negligible that: 
• There will be no substantial increase in power in the fuel rods 
• No coolability of nuclear fuel is not endangered 
• There will be no obstruction of the reactor scram or other movement of 
control rods. 
• There will be no hampering in the handling of fuel rods. 
The likelihood of a fuel failure caused by mechanical interaction among fuel pellet 
and cladding will be very low. In order to ensure this, functioning limits for variations in 
power and the rates of change will be determined for nuclear fuel, taking into 
consideration the stress and corrosion of the cladding. 
 
1.3 Nuclear fuel design criteria for anticipated operational occurrences 
In anticipated operational occurrences, the fuel shall accomplish the following 
conditions: 
• There will be no melting in the fuel pellets. 
• There shall be adequate cooling of the cladding. The cooling of the cladding 
is taken to be adequate if there is a 95% likelihood at 95% confidence level that the hottest 
fuel rod does not reach heat transfer crisis. Alternatively, it may be verified that the total 
number of rods attaining heat transfer crisis does not exceed 0.1% of the total number of 
fuel rods in the reactor. 
• The likelihood of fuel failure that is caused by mechanical interaction 
between fuel and cladding will be very low. [27] 
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2 Security 
2.1 Nuclear Security and Physical protection system 
Physical protection consists of a number of actions to defend nuclear facilities and 
material contrary to sabotage, robbery, diversion, and other malicious acts. [28] 
Physical protection system is one of the primary systems used at nuclear facilities 
for protecting these facilities by providing defense against terrorist attacks, likelihood of 
bombing, sabotage, and theft. Physical protection or security is defined as that part of 
security concerned with physical actions designed to protect personnel; to avert illegal 
access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard against 
surveillance, sabotage, damage, and theft. A system may be defined as a collection of 
objects or elements designed and constructed to achieve an objective according to a 
procedure. The designer of any physical protection system must have the system's main 
objective or aim in mind. The main objective of a PPS is to stop radiological sabotage and 
robbery of nuclear materials or amenities existing within the nuclear facility. Robbery and 
sabotage of the nuclear facilities may be averted in two ways either by deterring or by 
defeating the adversary. Deterrence occurs by employing a PPS that is seeming by 
possible adversary as very tough to be defeated; it makes the facility an unattractive target. 
The main Physical Protection System (PPS) functions include Detection, Delay 
and Response. [29] Detection is a process in a physical protection system that starts with 
sensing a potentially malevolent or otherwise unlawful act and that is completed with the 
evaluation of the cause of the alarm. Delay is the component of a PPS intended to increase 
the penetration time of an adversary for entry into and/or departure from the nuclear 
facility or transport. Response refers to the persons, on-site or off-site, who are armed and 
appropriately equipped and trained to counter an attempted unlawful removal or an act of 
sabotage. [30] Physical protection detection systems can include active infrared sensors, 
infrasonic sensors, capacitance proximity sensors, electric field sensors, and radiation 
sensors. [31] The conventional PPS combines two substantial surrounding fences with a 
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clear zone in between and consist of several advanced sensors and interconnecting 
communications. Physical protection systems (PPS) at diverse locations are rarely 
identical due to vast the differences in facilities, targets, and threats. The elementary 
design for PPS is quite well recognized but substantial engineering and design tailoring is 
often required for each site. [32] 
Nuclear security refers to the prevention and recognition of, and response to theft, 
sabotage, unlawful access, illegitimate transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear 
material, other radioactive materials or their associated facilities. [33] 
Nuclear security and protection system Promotes the advancement and 
implementation or employment of technology and systems for the physical protection of 
nuclear materials and facilities. [34] The three distinct steps of nuclear security include: 
• Defining the requirements 
• Designing the physical protection system based on the requirements, and 
• Evaluating the physical protection system to assess or evaluate whether it 
meets the performance requirements. 
Adversaries can be classified into three distinct groups. These include outsiders, 
insiders, and outsiders in collusion with insiders. For each group of adversaries, the full 
range of tactics or strategies including deceit, force, stealth, or any combination of these 
must be well thought-out. 
Deceit is the attempted defeat of a security system by using false or incorrect 
authorization and identification; force is the unconcealed, forcible attempt to overcome a 
security system; and stealth is the attempt to defeat the detection system and enter the 
facility secretly. Vital capabilities for the adversary comprises of his knowledge of the 
PPS, his level of motivation, any skills that would be useful in the attack, the speed or 
swiftness with which the attack is carried out, and his ability to carry tools and weapons. 
Because it is not often possible to test and assess all possible capabilities of an 
unknown adversary, the designer and analyst must make assumptions. These assumptions 
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can be based on published information about human performance and the tested 
vulnerabilities of physical protection elements. [35] The most tough adversaries to address 
or tackle using the PPS are terrorists, but activists and demonstrators are also hard due to 
the ambiguity of their actions and intents. 
The insider threat is a global concern for nuclear security since an adversary with 
a colluding insider is very treacherous or dangerous. [36] The main objectives of physical 
protection or nuclear security are: 
• To defend or protect against unlawful/unauthorized removal 
Protecting against stealing and other illegal taking of nuclear material 
• To locate and recover missing nuclear material 
Ensuring the employment of rapid and wide-ranging measures to locate and, where 
appropriate, recover stolen nuclear material. 
• To protect or defend against sabotage. 
Protecting nuclear facilities and nuclear materials against sabotage. 
• To lessen the effects of sabotage. 
Mitigating or reducing the radiological consequences of sabotage. [37] 
 
2.1.1 Requirements of a Physical Protection System 
2.1.2 General requirements of physical protection system 
The general requirements of a physical protection system are: 
• The physical protection system should be operating at the during period of 
supply of nuclear materials at a nuclear facility. 
• During decommissioning or dismantling of a nuclear and storage facility, the 
physical   protection   system   should   be   operating   till   final extraction   of   nuclear   
materials from the storage and nuclear facility is done. 
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• The physical protection system should operate under normal conditions and 
in situations of a nuclear facility in which normal conditions were breached due to 
unauthorized act on it, causing injury to working personnel (population), giving rise to 
threat to the life of personnel (population), and also possible damage to the environment. 
• In the physical protection system, there should be data protection, including 
confidentiality of data or information about the arrangement structure and functioning of 
the physical protection system, its integrity and approved access to it, of which if 
breached, may decrease the efficiency of the whole physical protection system or of its 
discrete elements. 
• At a nuclear facility, there should be defense not relating to nuclear 
installation or storage facilities, a nuclear facility communications and elements, for which 
in the process of vulnerability analysis, the need to avoid unlawful activities was 
identified. 
• In exceptional cases when it is impossible to completely put in place the 
requirements for the physical protection system at a nuclear facility established by the 
existing Federal rules and regulations, compensatory structural and technical procedures 
should be adopted. The adequacy of procedures taken should be confirmed by an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the physical protection system. [38] 
 
2.1.3 Physical protection requirements for nuclear facilities 
Nuclear materials that need physical protection include nuclear reactors, fuel cycle 
facilities, and spent fuel storage and disposal facilities. The physical protection programs 
for these nuclear materials and facilities include the following important features: 
• Threat assessment: This evaluation is done to determine how much physical 
protection is sufficient. 
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• Physical Protection Areas: These areas graded to provide defense-in-depth 
with fences, barriers and controls for the Exclusion, Protected, Vital, and Material Access 
Areas. 
• Intrusion Detection: This makes use of intrusion detectors to notify the site's 
security force of a potential intruder. 
• Intrusion Alarm Assessment: This is an evaluation done to distinguish 
between false or nuisance alarms and actual intrusions and to initiate response. 
• Armed Response to protect public health and safety and the common 
defense and security, by defending nuclear material or a nuclear facility against an 
intrusion or attack. 
• Regulatory Initiatives: These are taken to ensure that the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's(NRC’s) Domestic Safeguards Regulations, Guidance, and 
Communications continue to effectively protect and defend the Nation's nuclear facilities 
and material in different threat environments. 
 
2.1.4 Physical protection during transit 
Conveyance or transportation of spent or used nuclear fuel and other high activity 
shipments need physical protection. Important features of physical protection for 
transportation include: 
• Use of NRC-certified, structurally rugged, shipment overpacks and canisters. 
Fuel within canisters is dense and in solid form, not readily dispersible as respirable 
particles. 
• Advance planning and coordination with local law enforcement along 
approved routes. 
• Protection of information about schedules. 
• Regular communication between transports and control centers. 
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• Armed escorts within heavily populated areas. 
• Vehicle immobility measures to protect against movement of a hijacked 
shipment before response forces arrive. [39] 
 
 2.1.5 Design and evaluation process outline 
The design of an active PPS includes the determination of PPS purpose or 
objectives, the initial design or characterization of a PPS, the assessment of the design, 
and in many cases, redesign or modification of the system. To develop the objectives, the 
designer must initiate by collecting information about facility operations and conditions, 
such as a full description of the facility, working states, and the physical protection 
requirements. 
The designer then needs to describe the threat. This involves considering features 
or characteristics about potential adversaries, such as class, capabilities, and range of 
strategies or tactics. 
Next, the designer ought to identify targets. Targets may be physical possessions, 
electronic data, people, or anything that might impact business operations. The designer 
now knows the aims of the PPS, that is, what to protect against whom. 
The next step is to design the new system or characterize the existing system. If 
designing a new system, people, procedures, and equipment must be integrated to meet 
the objectives of the system. If the system already exists, it must be characterized to 
establish a baseline of performance. 
After the PPS is designed, it must be analysed and assessed to ensure it meets the 
physical protection objectives. Assessment must permit for features working together to 
guarantee protection rather than regarding each feature separately. Due to the complex 
nature of protection systems, an assessment generally involves modeling techniques. If 
any vulnerability is found, the original system needs to be restructured to correct the 
weaknesses and a re-evaluation conducted. 
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Figure 2.1- Design and evaluation process outline 
 
2.1.6 Determination of Physical protection system objectives 
The first step in the development of a PPS design is to determine the objectives of 
the PPS. To formulate these objectives, the designer must understand a facility’s 
operations and conditions, define the threat, and identify the targets. 
Facility operations and conditions that describe a facility include: the location of 
the site border, building location, building internal floor plans, and access points. A 
description of the activities taking place within the facility is also required, as well as 
identification of any existing physical protection features 
 
2.1.7 Threat definition 
Next, a threat definition for the facility must be made. Information about an 
adversary’s tactics and capabilities must be collected. Adversaries can be divided into 
three groups: outsiders, insiders, and outsiders in collusion with insiders. For each group 
of adversaries, a full range of strategies should be well thought-out such as: deceit, force, 
stealth, or any combination of these. Important capabilities for the adversary include: 
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• knowledge of the PPS, level of motivation, any skills that would be useful in 
the attack, the speed with which the attack is carried out, and ability to carry tools and 
weapons. 
 
2.1.8 Target identification 
Finally, identifying potential targets within the facility should be performed. The 
attractiveness of the target determines the measure and method of protection that will be 
applied to the facility. [40] Target identification provides the basis for the PPS design by 
focusing on what to protect, while PPS design addresses how to protect. 
Target identification is an evaluation of what to protect without consideration of 
the threat or the difficulty of providing physical protection. In other words, target 
identification determines areas, assets, or actions to be protected and generally are those 
that have undesirable consequence of loss to the enterprise. The danger to these objects, 
and the comfort or difficulty of protecting the objects against a particular treat is 
considered after the objects are identified. 
Asset refers to any target of an adversary attack. Main targets may consist of 
physical resources, electronic data, people, or any other thing that could influence business 
operations. Secondary targets can also include PPS components that can be attacked to 
reduce system effectiveness and facilitate an attack. Identification of both types of assets 
is often required depending on the threat goals, capability, and motivation and the 
consequence of loss of the assets. [41] 
 
2.1.9 Design of a physical protection system 
The required functions of an effective PPS include Detection, delay and response. 
These functions have to be performed in order and within a period of time that is less than 
the time required for the adversary to execute his mission. An effective PPS has several 
specific characteristics. 
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A well-made system provides defense-in-depth, diminishes the consequence of 
component failures, and exhibits balanced protection. Moreover, a design process based 
on performance criteria rather than feature criteria will select elements and procedures 
according to the contribution they make to overall system performance. The procedures 
of a Physical Protection System have to be compatible with the procedures of the facility. 
Security, safety, and operational objectives must be accomplished together at all times. 
[42] 
Physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities must include elements of 
deterrence which consist of signs, lighting, visual robustness, etc., detectors which include 
exterior sensors, door and interior intrusion sensors, television surveillance, personnel 
access control systems, material screening systems, alarm stations, etc., delay objects 
which include fences, gates, vehicle barriers, doors, walls, and dispensable delays, etc., 
objects of response including unarmed and armed guards, highly skilled special response 
forces, local law enforcement officers, in some cases detachments of the military, etc., and 
mitigation strategies which include ways on how to minimize the consequences or effects 
if theft or sabotage acts are successful. The sequential connection of these functions, 
which must all be present, makes the system stronger. 
Defense-in-depth for detection, delay, and response is a good practice. The 
presence of these multiple layers requires an adversary to avoid several protective devices 
in sequential order to be successful. For example, an adversary might need to breach two 
or more distinct barriers before gaining access to a reactor control room. The defense-in-
depth notion adds to a PPS overall reliability by abolishing dependency on one barrier or 
system. Furthermore, it deters the adversary by adding uncertainty, requiring different 
procedures and tools, and creating supplementary steps. 
Deterrence is impossible to measure and the design and assessment process is 
aimed at creating a measurable level of risk. Mitigation is significant in minimizing the 
consequence or effect of the overall accomplishment of the adversary, but the main 
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accountability of the PPS is to prevent the adversary from being successful. Still, 
mitigation is important, and if it is affected by working procedures at a facility, the 
consequence or effect of a successful adversary attack might be significantly minimizing. 
[43] 
Detection refers to the sensing and identification of an intrusive act at any point in 
the protection system and it is often reported by an intrusion sensor and broadcasted 
through the alarm communication sub-system. 
The intrusion alarm has to be followed by evaluation; if appropriate, the response 
force will then be alerted. 
The discovery of an intrusion or an attempted intrusion into a protected area is one 
of the primary functions of a PPS. 
It is important to make follow up when there is a detection as early as possible 
after the start of the intrusive action in order to provide the ample time for evaluation and 
response. [44] 
Intrusion detection must be carried out at the physical barrier surrounding the 
protected area and timely assessment or evaluation should also be performed. Clear areas 
should be provided on both sides of the boundary of the protected area with illumination 
adequate for assessment. To protect against illegal access or malicious acts, special 
attention should be given to all points of potential access. The boundary of the protected 
zone should normally include a physical barrier in addition to and outside the building 
walls. In aspects where the walls of a building are of a specially solid construction, these 
walls may be seen as being the perimeter of the protected area under conditions specified 
by a security survey. [45] 
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2.3 Delay 
It is an element for decelerating an adversary progress. Delay can be achieved by 
personnel, barriers, locks and activated delays. Response force personnel can be well 
thought-out as components of delay if they are in static and well secured positions. 
The measure of the effectiveness of delay is the time required by the adversary 
after discovery, this delay is no value to the effectiveness of the Physical Protection 
System, since it does not provide extra time to respond to the adversary. Delay before 
detection is basically a deterrent. 
 
2.3.1 Response 
The response function comprises of the tactics taken by the response force to stop 
adversary accomplishment. Response can include both interruption and neutralization. 
Interruption is defined as the adequate number of response force personnel 
arriving at the right location to stop the adversary’s advancement. It includes the 
announcement to the response force of precise information about adversary actions and 
the distribution of the response force. Neutralization defines the actions and success of the 
responders after interruption. The principal measure of response effectiveness is the time 
between receival of a communication of adversary’s actions and the disruption of their 
activities. 
Response time is the key measure as responders must be at the right place in order 
to counteract the adversary. At locations where there is no abrupt response, it is presumed 
that the asset or object can be lost and this is an acceptable risk. 
In these cases, the primary response may be after-loss-event investigation, 
recovery of the asset and criminal prosecution. 
Deployment defines the actions or movements of the response force from the time 
communication is received until the force is in position to interrupt the progress of 
adversary. The effectiveness measure of this function is the probability of distribution of 
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response force to the adversary’s location and the time needed to organize or position the 
response force. [46] 
A longer or lengthier response time is needed if personnel have to rush to the area 
or zone. In that case, we may have to design layers of perimeter security such as an outer 
fence with barbed wire offsets, then bundles of coiled razor wire, and inner fencing. [47] 
Security force personnel provide the response actions or movements to interdict 
and counteract adversaries. The response force usually includes skillfully trained primary 
and secondary responders and patrolling security forces who augment the engagement by 
primary and secondary responders. [48] 
The duty of a response force in a PPS is to accomplish the roles necessary to avert 
theft or sabotage of nuclear materials and facilities. Response force personnel are used to 
resolute incidents that involves use of force options up to the use of lethal force if required 
to stop a threat. All or part of the response force may be situated on-site or off-site and 
may consist of site personnel or local police forces, regional police forces, national police 
forces, or military forces. They may be dedicated to the site or pulled from other duties to 
form a response in the event of an incident at a nuclear facility. In any event, security 
guards and response forces must use as appropriate, and they must be trained, equipped, 
and assessed to ensure they execute their roles effectively against the threats defined in 
the design basis threat or assessment and in accordance with state laws and regulations. 
The ultimate objective of all response forces at a nuclear facility is to prevent an 
adversary from gaining access to a nuclear material from a site or sabotaging a nuclear 
facility. [49] 
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Figure 2.2- Image showing defense-in-depth [50] 
 
2.3.2 Evaluation of the physical protection system design and effectiveness 
Analysis and assessment of the security system design commences with the 
analysis and detailed understanding of the protection objectives the designed system must 
meet. This can be accomplished simply by making inspection of essential features of the 
system such as intrusion detectors, entry control, access delay, response communications 
and a response force. The security system will yield high performance results only when 
all of those features work together to assure adequate levels of protection. 
The result of this phase of the design and evaluation process is a system 
vulnerability assessment. Evaluation of the system design will either find that the design 
successfully accomplished the protection objectives or it will detect weaknesses. If the 
protection objectives are accomplished then the process is finalized. Periodic assessment 
is required to make sure that the original protection objectives continue to be effective and 
that the physical protection system continues to meet them. If the PPS is found to be 
ineffective, vulnerabilities in the physical protection system must be identified. This leads 
to modification or redesigning of the initial protection system to correct its vulnerable 
parts. [51] 
The PPS capability to withstand a potential attack and avert an adversary from 
achieving his objectives is usually considered as PPS effectiveness. The assessment of 
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effectiveness serves as a basis for evaluating whether a Physical Protection System meets 
its intended objective. The Physical Protection System is well-thought-out to active only 
when it is possible to withstand the threat, resulting from a potential attack on an object, 
to an acceptable level. 
The assessment of PPS effectiveness is anticipated to be an essential part of the 
development and design process of any PPS to show that the recommended system meets 
set requirements. It is important to assess the effectiveness each and every time the system 
design or the conditions of use changes significantly. The analysis of PPS effectiveness is 
at any rate quite a difficult duty, because the PPS ability to survive a potential attack 
depends not only on PPS features, but also on adversary abilities. 
In view of the info put above it could be stated that the purpose of the assessment 
of PPS effectiveness is mainly to: 
• Verify whether the PPS is designed and implemented so that it could observe 
specified requirements determined by a PPS user or a relevant executive power (a state or 
a final control element). 
• Discover possible imperfections in PPS design or implementation which are 
to be removed in order to accomplish the requirements. 
• Analyze the results of changes in the PPS design and improvements. 
• Verify regularly the PPS effectiveness to analyze possible changes in PPS or 
threat. 
• Evaluate the effectiveness of the expenditures on single PPS measures. 
The assessment of effectiveness is a basic condition for having active, 
economically satisfactory physical protection, as it enables us to determine the weaknesses 
of the PPS which are to be strengthened, and also points at the locations where the system 
is designed ineffectively bringing high financial needs and not having appropriate 
influence to physical protection effectiveness. Usually, when assessing the effectiveness, 
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qualitative as well as quantitative analytical measures might be used. [52] Systems that 
are designed to protect high-value critical assets normally require a quantitative analysis. 
Examples include the PPS of residential buildings, offices, smaller shops, restaurant, etc., 
while systems protecting lower-value assets may be analysed using less rigorous 
qualitative techniques. Examples include high-security systems in nuclear power plants, 
nuclear weapons etc. The latter or final are more appropriate for lower consequence loss 
assets and so will be better able to resist loss or damage of that asset. With a qualitative 
analysis, the analyst has to define the threats and targets and analyze system performance, 
but these should be tailored to meet the budget and time constraints of the analysis. [53] 
For most analyzing models, objectives and antagonist paths must first be 
identified. The analyst must then take into consideration the adversary’s objective: to 
complete the path. 
The following three closely interrelated methods or techniques are based on 
detection of path with lowest cumulative probability of detection up to critical point of 
detection and are proposed for assessment of technical effectiveness of nuclear facility 
security. They utilize central division of security sectors with one sector containing 
protected asset in middle of whole system and are based on intruder’s familiarity with the 
security system. 
The path with lowest cumulative probability of detection up to critical point of 
detection is called critical path or path with lowest cumulative probability of interruption. 
Detection before critical point of detection is called timely detection. 
 
2.3.3 EASI method (Estimation of Adversary Sequence Interruption) 
Allows the computations of probability of interruption only on one predefined 
path. 
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2.3.4 ASD Method (Adversary Sequence Diagram)  
This is a technique for graphic depiction of possible or potential intruder paths in 
security system. ASD describes facility and its security system as layers that isolates 
external intruder from his target inside facility. Individual physical areas are divided by 
protective barriers that include everything that may delay or detect intruder. 
 
2.3.5 SAVI method (Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability to Intrusion) 
Combines EASI and ASD methods and evaluates every possible path to central zone from 
the viewpoint of probability of interruption and creates a list of ten most vulnerable paths 
according to their possibilities of interruption. If values of probability of interruption are 
equal, it lists paths according to total length of attack. Main SAVI program is accompanied 
by extensive database of delay and detection parameters of most commonly used 
protection elements. SAVI method implements also sensitivity analysis.  Given that most 
critical parameter is time required for response, for sensitivity analysis SAVI uses 
different values of response force time. Output is of course probability of interruption. 
From the viewpoint of modeling, the main technique or method of evaluation of 
effectiveness or calculation of probability of interruption may be identified as suitable, 
but models do not completely reflect demands of systems for protection of persons and 
property from the viewpoint of modeling of protected area.  Stated disadvantage (even 
from viewpoint of nuclear facilities) is absence of probability of intruder elimination 
calculation. [54] 
 
2.3.6 Redesign of the physical protection system 
The result of the analysis phase is system vulnerability assessment. If the system 
is found to be ineffective, vulnerabilities in the system must be identified. This leads to 
modification or redesigning of the initial physical protection system to correct its 
vulnerable parts. It is possible that the PPS goals or objectives would also need to be re-
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evaluated. A re-evaluation of the redesigned system is done to check vulnerability 
corrected. 
 
2.3.7 Design Basis Threat/ Threat assessment 
The likelihood that terrorists, criminals, or protestors might try or make effort to 
sabotage a nuclear facility, steal nuclear material, or perform other unauthorized actions 
within the nuclear industry has to be taken into consideration in the protection of nuclear 
facilities. Physical Protection Systems (PPS) are created in order to counter the defined 
threat to ensure maximum physical protection of nuclear facilities. The development of 
PPS involves balancing security requirements with resources that are available. The threat 
affects both of these aspects. In several or most cases, the threat must be assumed, due to 
the fact that it has not been demonstrated in frequent attacks on nuclear facilities. In cases 
where threat information is not available, postulates must be made regarding the threat in 
order to create a comprehensive set of PPS requirements and prioritize financial and 
additional resources. An organized or structured analysis of the capabilities and intentions 
of potential threat capabilities and intentions provides a sound basis for making such 
assumptions. 
The Assessment of Threat is considered to be an independent effort that is not 
constrained by considerations of budget or policy. The threat assessment bounds the threat 
problem to support the subsequent DBT development effort. [55] 
The design basis threat (DBT) defines the general features or characteristics of 
adversaries that nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel cycle facilities must protect or 
defend against in order to prevent radiological sabotage and theft of special nuclear 
material. The NRC licensees makes use of the DBT as the basis for implementing highly 
defensive approaches at specific nuclear plant sites through security plans, safeguards 
contingency plans, and guard training and qualification plans. [56] 
The description of a DBT comprises four important themes. These are: 
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• External and/or Insider adversaries – A potential adversary is a group of 
individuals or people considered to have the intent and the capabilities to conduct a 
malicious malevolent act. 
• Malicious acts leading to unacceptable consequences – Measures has to be 
taken to avoid malicious acts, such as the illegal removal of nuclear material or sabotage 
and protect against their unacceptable consequences. 
• Attributes and characteristics – The attributes and characteristics of 
potential adversaries describe their capabilities to carry out a malicious act. Capabilities 
may include weapons, explosives, tools, transportation, insiders and insider collusion, 
skills, tactics, and number of individuals. These capabilities help determine the detection, 
delay, and response criteria for design and evaluation of an effective physical protection 
system. 
• Design and evaluation – A DBT, defined at the State level, is a means used 
to help in the establishment of performance requirements for the design of PPS. A DBT 
is as well used to help State authorities and operators evaluate the effectiveness of the 
systems to counter adversaries by assessing the systems’ performances against their skills 
and capabilities which are described in the DBT. 
The DBT outlines the set of adversary features or characteristics for which the 
State organizations and operators both have protection responsibility and accountability. 
The division of these responsibilities might differ according to different States. The 
Design Basis Threat is used to describe or define the requirements given to the operators 
and to clarify the protection functions that are the responsibilities of the State's Authorities. 
It’s very important to recognize that the specific competences or capabilities 
contained in a Design Basis Threat are autonomous of which organizations (Operator 
alone, State and Operator together, or Operator in association with another organisation) 
are intended to use it. A country or State may wish to have several DBT either to reflect 
the various targets (for instance, radioactive and nuclear materials) and the protection 
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needs according to different types of facilities (for instance, research reactors and nuclear 
power plants), different adversary objectives (for instance, theft or robbery, sabotage, 
economic disruption), or different geographic regions. This differences or distinction 
points out the importance of clarifying the planned use of a DBT prior to developing it. 
[57] 
 A DBT gives or provides: 
• A basis for confidence or assurance that the PPS developed in a State is 
effective and appropriate. 
• A basis for PPS design and a consistent standard for evaluating the 
tolerability or adequacy of the system. 
• A baseline criterion against which the necessity for changes in physical 
protection can be assessed. 
• A basis for assigning or allocating responsibilities between organizations 
involved. 
The Design Basis Threat can allow or permit adaptation of the PPS to address 
special or unique characteristics or features of the nuclear facilities or materials. The DBT 
can also help avoid unnecessary protection being given or applied to materials and 
facilities while making sure that those materials or facilities for which a malicious act 
could lead to high consequences get the required protection they need. In this way, the use 
of the Design Basis Threat approach to physical protection can help to minimize the 
arbitrariness that might otherwise exist in establishing requirements for the physical 
protection of nuclear facilities and materials under State jurisdiction. 
Specifying a Design Basis Threat is one of the technique for a country or State to 
establish the required performance level for new or already existing physical protection 
systems (PPS). The DBT helps in ensuring that physical protection systems (PPS) are 
effective against possible threats without overdesigning them. A state DBT can also give 
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or provide a reliable or consistent basis for requirements across all nuclear facilities within 
a nation. [58] 
Threats on storage site and nuclear facilities can be in the form of sabotage or theft 
of nuclear materials. Sabotage may include: 
• With people (outsiders, insider or outsiders in collusion with insiders) 
 
• Without people (the use of flying objects such as drones) 
Sabotage refers to any form of deliberate act directed towards a nuclear material 
or facility in use, storage or transport which could jeopardize the health and safety of 
workers, and the general public by exposing them to radiation or release of radioactive 
substances.” [59] 
Insider threats are probably the most dangerous and serious challenges that nuclear 
security systems face. All of the cases of robbery or theft of nuclear materials where the 
circumstances of the theft are identified were committed either by insiders or with the 
assistance or help of insiders; given that the other cases involve majority of the material 
stolen secretly without the awareness of anyone knowing the material was missing, there 
is every reason to believe that they were committed by insiders as well. Similarly, resentful 
employees from inside nuclear facilities have committed many of the known events or 
incidents of nuclear sabotage.  
 
2.3.8 Threats and vulnerability analysis 
Vulnerability analysis is a necessary step in creating an effective security system. 
Based on its results, design options and technical security complexes are developed or 
created. The vulnerability analysis is carried out in order to determine the possible 
consequences in case of an attack on a nuclear facility, identify weaknesses and 
shortcomings of the security system or considered design variants of the system, and in 
the end the best choice or version of the security system for a particular facility is created. 
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Procedure for the analysis of the vulnerability of a nuclear facility is established 
by departmental or interdepartmental normative legal acts. When preparing a report on 
the analysis of vulnerability of nuclear object is also recommended to take into account 
the requirements of regulatory legal acts of the atomic energy management authority and 
documents operating organization, determining the order and content of the analysis 
vulnerability of a nuclear facility.  
 
2.3.9 Analysis of insider threats 
Insider threat is a general term for a threat to data or security of an organization 
that comes from within. Such kinds of threats are mostly attributed to employees or former 
employees, but may also result from third parties, including temporary workers, customers 
or contractors. 
Insider threats can be of several forms, but threats can be considered as either 
accidental or malicious. 
Accidental threats refer to circumstances or situations in which damage or loss 
data arises as a result of an insider who has no malevolent or malicious intent. For instance, 
a worker or an employee might accidentally delete an important or vital file, fall victim to 
a phishing attempt or unintentionally share more data or files with a business partner than 
is consistent with organization’s policy or legal requirements. 
Malicious threats refer to deliberate attempts by an insider to access and 
potentially harm an organization's data, systems or IT infrastructure. These forms of 
insider threats are usually attributed to resentful employees or formal employees who 
believe that the company or organization mistreated and or wronged them in some way, 
and hence feel justified in quest of revenge. Insiders may also become threats when they 
are subverted by malicious outsiders, either through financial enticements or through 
blackmail. 
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A malicious insider can also be a hacker, also called a black hat or cracker, that is, 
an employee of a rival organization or company or a member of a terrorist group that 
opposes the organization. In these circumstances, there would-be attacker infiltrates the 
company, either by looking for employment or by pretending to be an employee, vendor, 
delivery courier or other trusted third-party. As soon as the threat actor gets physical 
access to the facility, he or she looks for various ways to carry out an attack. [60] 
Insider threats pose dangers to anybody who handles information that is top-secret 
or proprietary, material that is extremely important or valuable or hazardous, people or 
individuals who must be protected, or facilities or equipment’s that might be sabotaged. 
[61] 
Insider threats are the major security breaches and are so expensive to remediate 
and so difficult to deal with. The main reasons been that: 
• Insider threats can go undetected for years – The longer you take to detect 
a breach or a leak, the more remediation expenses go up. Insider threats can be very tough 
and difficult to detect, which is why they are the costliest to remediate. 
• It is difficult to differentiate or distinguish harmful actions from regular 
work – This is why insider threats are so difficult to detect. When an employee is working 
with sensitive data or information, it is virtually not possible to know whether they are 
doing something malicious or not. 
• It is easy for employees to cover their actions – While it’s not easy to detect 
malicious activities when they occur, it can be virtually not possible to detect them post-
factum. Any tech-savvy employee will know how to clean up after themselves by 
removing, editing or deleting logs to cover malicious action. 
• It is difficult to prove guilt – Even if you do succeed in detecting malicious 
actions, employees can simply claim that it was a mistake they made and get away with 
it. It is virtually impossible to prove guilt in such cases. 
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Insider threats are very dangerous or unsafe and can be caused by any of these 
groups below: 
• Privileged users – These are often the most trusted workers in an 
organization or company but they also have the most opportunities to misuse your data, 
both deliberately and inadvertently. 
• Third parties – Isolated employees, subcontractors, third-party vendors and 
partners all frequently or regularly have access to your system. Since you don’t know 
anything about the security of their systems and often even about the very people 
accessing your data or information, you should treat them as a security risk. 
• Terminated employees – Equivalent to the case cited at the beginning of 
this article, workers or employees can take data or information with them when their 
appointment is terminated. Even more importantly, occasionally they can access your data 
even after their termination, either through malware or backdoors or by retaining their 
access since nobody was worried about disabling it. 
The core reason why malicious insiders conduct such wrongdoings includes: 
• Acting on opportunity – A worker or an employee sees an opportunity to 
make use of organization data for personal gain or to steal and sell it, and then makes 
decisions to act on it, such actions are infrequently preceded by long-term planning and 
preparation. They mostly occur relatively spontaneously. 
• Taking revenge for perceived injustice – Resentful workers or employees 
can steal data or simply leak it online or destroy it in order to get back to you for a supposed 
injustice. 
• Making a statement – Sometimes, a worker or an employee wants to make 
a social or political speech or statement and leaks data online or causes damage to it in 
order to do so. 
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• Doing competitors bidding – Business or corporate espionage is a thing, 
and even truthful or trustworthy employees or workers can be approached and offered a 
deal which they would be find difficult to refuse. This usually involves bribery and/or 
blackmail. 
• Seeing themselves as a future competition – Some workers and employees 
may want to establish their own competing business and make decisions to get ahead by 
using your data or information. They may contact clients and steal or make changes in 
your client list or even offer their services while still working. [62] 
 
2.4 Analysis of outsider/outsider in collusion with insider threats 
Outsider threats involves the possibility that people or individuals carrying 
weapons or groups from outside a nuclear facility gain access and steal weapons, weapon 
components or fissile material. 
The vulnerability of nuclear power plants to deliberate attack is of concern in the 
area of nuclear security and safety. Civilian research reactors, nuclear power plants, 
certain naval fuel facilities, uranium enrichment plants, fuel fabrication plants, and even 
potentially uranium mines are vulnerable to attacks which might lead to widespread 
radioactive pollution or contamination. The attack threat is of several general types which 
include commando-like ground-based attacks on equipment which if disabled might lead 
to the meltdown of reactor core or dispersal of radioactive substances; and attacks from 
external sources such as an aircraft crash into a reactor complex, or cyber-attacks. 
Terrorists might target nuclear plants in order to release nuclear and radioactive 
materials into the community or environment. If terrorist groups could sufficiently cause 
damage to safety or security systems in an attempt to cause melting down of the reactor 
core at a nuclear power plant, and/or sufficiently cause damage to spent fuel pools or 
cooling system, such an attack may result in a widespread of radioactive substances. [63] 
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The likelihood that armed individuals or groups may gain access, and sabotage a 
nuclear facility, steal components or fissile material involves the threat from outsiders. 
The outsider’s objective is to gain control of these objects or items for their own use or to 
allocate them to another state or to another state actors. Terrorist might attempt to capture 
such components or fissile or radioactive materials when they are being transported. To 
increase the chances of causing serious damage, attackers or terrorist would dedicate 
substantial effort to employ or recruit insiders, as they would have more knowledge about 
the detailed operations and vulnerabilities at these places. Thus, the “insider collusion” 
would serve as a multiplier effect for terrorist or outside attackers. Experts or skilled and 
highly trained insiders such as nuclear engineers would have knowledge on how to disable 
or deactivate emergency sources of power and cooling systems. Such deactivation would 
increase the possibility of a reactor core meltdown and release radiations and radioactive 
substances. Insiders could sabotage other important or vital plant systems while outside 
attackers hold the security guard or forces under obstruction or siege. [64] 
The primary attraction of civil nuclear-energy objects or facilities as terrorist 
targets lies in the potential for creating a release of radioactive materials large enough to 
cause significant casualties or fatalities, land and water contamination. Destruction of a 
vital piece of energy-supply setup in the targeted country and the likelihood that a 
successful attack would result in the shutdown of nuclear-energy facilities worldwide 
might be seen as collateral “benefits” by terrorist group. 
Nuclear-terrorism dangers can be classified into three groups: 
• dirty bombs, which means conventional explosives or incendiary devices that 
disperse radioactive materials 
• attacks on nuclear-energy or nuclear-weapon facilities, and 
• terrorist acquisition and use of nuclear-explosive weapons. 
Additionally, the mere declaration or assertion of the capability to carry out any 
of these categories of attacks or a clear threat to do so at a specific time and place may 
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assist terrorist purposes, even if an attack does not happen or occur. The community or 
public’s deep-rooted fear of nuclear weapons, radioactivity and nuclear radiation tends to 
increase not only the impact if an attack occurs, but also the dreadful effect of threats to 
do so. 
Of all the three classes of nuclear-terrorism dangers, the dirty bomb is the easiest 
for terrorists to perform or execute. In most situations or circumstances, a dirty bomb 
would cause a quite few immediate mortalities or fatalities beyond those caused directly 
by the chemical high-explosive used. A possible exclusion could be the use of an 
incendiary device to cause a dispersion of a potent radionuclide into the aeration or 
ventilation system of an office building. The major effects of most dirty bomb actions or 
events would be in property damage, the costs of temporarily abandoning and cleaning up 
the polluted or contaminated areas and in the fear and depression created in the public. 
Victory in the second group of danger, that is, attacks on nuclear-weapon or 
nuclear-energy facilities would be very difficult for terrorists or attackers to achieve but 
could produce significantly higher casualties. The effect of such an attack could involve 
several hundreds or thousands of immediate mortalities, several thousands of delayed 
deaths from radiation-induced cancers, and massive economic damage from the 
contamination of the area or territory. Victory in the third category, that of acquiring and 
discharging a nuclear weapon is probably the most difficult for attackers or terrorist group 
to achieve. However, such an attack could lead to several hundreds or thousands of 
immediate deaths resulting from the effects of blast and burns of explosions in the central 
part most important city, as well as several other casualties from fallout and vast property 
damage.  
 
 Nuclear-explosive weapons are those where most of the energy is released 
from nuclear reactions other than chemical high-explosives. [65] 
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A nuclear weapon refers to any kind of weapon that derives its incredible 
destructive force from the sudden release of the energy created by a self-sustaining 
reactions of nuclear fission and/or fusion. Fission-based weapons obtain their energy from 
the splitting of atoms, which comprises of all first-generation U.S. nuclear weapons, 
including the bombs which were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Current nuclear weapons are even more destructive and obtain some or most of 
their explosive yield from a process called fusion. Fusion is conceptually the converse of 
fission, joining rather than splitting atoms. When two or more light atoms fuse, a large 
amount of energy is released. [66] 
Considering all the terrorist threats facing the world, perhaps the severest is the 
likelihood of terrorists creating or obtaining a nuclear weapon and discharging it in a town 
or city. If an attacker or terrorist group exploded just one nuclear weapon, several 
hundreds or thousands of people could die due to the fact that, there is no effective 
protection against a nuclear explosion, one important remedy is to prevent terrorists from 
gaining access to nuclear bomb materials or weapons in the first place. Countries or 
nations are devoting inadequate attention to this problem and, in some cases, following 
and or pursuing policies that increase the risk of terrorists gaining access to nuclear 
weapons. 
A nuclear weapon requires either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. Luckily, 
these materials are not found in nature and are not easy to produce. Therefore, it means 
there are only two reasonable ways for attackers or terrorists to gain access nuclear 
weapons. Primarily, they could steal a complete nuclear weapon from existing arsenals or 
buy a stolen weapon. Also, terrorists could purchase the material needed to build a nuclear 
weapon and acquire the expertise to construct a bomb from this material. 
Since only a relatively small quantity of Highly Enriched Uranium or plutonium 
is required to construct a bomb, terrorists could feasibly steal sufficient material to build 
one or more nuclear weapons. A crude nuclear weapon would use forty to fifty (40-50) 
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kilograms, that is, (88-110 pounds) of Highly Enriched Uranium; a more sophisticated 
design would need twelve (12) kilograms, that is, 26 pounds of HEU or four (4) kilograms, 
that is, nine (9) pounds of plutonium. The robbery or theft of Highly Enriched Uranium 
would be very worrisome, because it is relatively straight-forward to construct a bomb 
using this material. 
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is used to fuel more than 100 research reactors 
in many of countries all over the world. Most of these facilities are used for academic or 
industrial purposes with insufficient security making them even more attractive targets for 
terrorists looking for nuclear weapons materials. 
Hundreds or thousands of these so-called tactical nuclear weapons, many of which 
are relatively small and do not have electronic locks to avert their unauthorized use are 
kept in some countries and in poorly secured locations or areas. 
Even in countries such as the United States, Japan, and France, safety and security 
measures for defending or protecting weapon-usable materials from stealing are probably 
insufficient to protect against modern terrorist threats. [67] 
 
2.4.1 Preventive measures against insider and outsider threats 
It is therefore significant that a list of the sensitive positions and possible insiders 
is checked or conducted to avoid the insider threat happening and reduce the possibility 
of outsiders working in collusion with employees. Some of the preventive measures that 
can be taken include: 
• Identification, verification, authentication and confirmation of staffs or 
employees. 
• Trustworthiness assessment, which refers to assessing or evaluating an 
employee or personnel's integrity, honesty and reliability during non-regular and regular 
employee routines. 
• Escort and surveil infrequent staff and visitors. 
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• Improve security awareness. 
• Improve the security information on nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. 
• Create or establish a quality assurance policy program and good organization 
culture. 
• Clearly demarcating critical areas with access control and procedural 
activities to limit access to the nuclear facility and materials data easily by an insider. 
• Strict law and disciplinary actions to punish criminal or offending insiders. 
• The use of detection, delay and response functions for the deterrence and 
prevention of malicious intrusion acts, to mitigate or lessen the consequences. [68] 
 
2.4.2 Nuclear power plant vulnerability 
Huge amounts of radioactive fission products are contained in nuclear power 
plants which, if dispersed, could pose a direct radiation hazard, pollute or contaminate soil 
and vegetation, and be consumed by humans and animals. 
High levels of human exposure to radiation can cause both immediate illness and 
death, and longer-term deaths by cancer and other diseases. 
To avoid the dispersal of radiations and radioactive material, nuclear fuel and its 
fission products are enclosed in metal cladding within a steel reactor vessel, which is 
located inside a concrete “containment” structure. The remaining or residual heat from the 
radioactive fission products could possibly melt the fuel-rod cladding even if the reactor 
were shut down. The most important concern in the operation of a nuclear power plant, in 
addition to controlling the nuclear chain reaction, is making sure that the core does not 
lose its coolant and “melt down” from the heat generated by the radioactive fission 
products inside the fuel rods. Therefore, even if the operators of a nuclear power plant 
shut down the reactor as they are supposed to during the events of a terrorist attack, the 
hazard or threat of a radioactive release would not be eliminated. 
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The containment structures of commercial reactors made of steel-reinforced 
concrete, several feet thick are intended to prevent the dispersion of most of a reactor’s 
radiations or radioactive material in the event of a loss of coolant and meltdown. Without 
any fissure in the containment, and without the dispersal of some source of energy such 
as a chemical explosion or fire, the radioactive fission products that escaped from the fuel 
cladding which is melting would mostly remain where they were. The two meltdown 
accidents that took place in power reactors, both at Three Mile Island in 1979 and at 
Chernobyl in the Soviet Union in 1986, demonstrate this phenomenon. These two 
occurred from a combination of operator error and design flaws. At Three Mile Island, the 
accident occurred due to loss of coolant which caused the fuel to melt, but there was no 
explosion or fire, and the containment prevented the escape of significant amounts of 
radioactive materials. At Chernobyl, which had no shielding material or containment, a 
hydrogen explosion and a fierce graphite fire caused a significant part of the radioactive 
core to be blown into the atmosphere, where it polluted large areas of the surrounding 
countryside and was noticed or detected in smaller amounts in neighboring countries.  
 
2.4.3 Vulnerability from Air Attack. 
Nuclear power plants are intended or designed to withstand earthquakes, 
hurricanes, and other life-threatening events, but attacks by large aircrafts loaded with 
fuel, such as those that crashed into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, were not 
anticipated when design requirements were considered or determined. A recorded 
interview revealed on Arab TV station Al-Jazeera, September 10, 2002, a statement which 
contains that Al Qaeda initially decided or planned to include a nuclear power plant in its 
2001 attack sites, intensified concern about airplane crashes. 
In light of the likelihood that an air attack might breach or penetrate the 
containment structure of a nuclear power plant, some interest groups have recommended 
or made a suggestion that such an event could be followed by a meltdown of a reactor 
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core and extensive exposure to radiation. Nuclear industry spokesmen or representatives 
have countered by pointing out that relatively small, low-lying nuclear power plants are 
tough targets for attack, and made arguments that, the penetration of the containment 
structure is unlikely, and that even if such penetration happens it probably wouldn’t reach 
the reactor vessel. They suggest that a continual fire, such as that which caused the melting 
of the structures in the World Trade Center buildings, would be not be possible unless an 
attacking plane completely penetrates the containment, including its fuel-bearing wings. 
Newly completed NRC studies “confirm that the possibility of both damaging the core of 
the reactor and releasing radioactive materials that could affect community or public 
health and safety is low. [69] 
 
2.4.4 Drones 
In technological or technical context, A drone is an unmanned aircraft. More 
officially, drones are known as unmanned aircraft systems (UASes) or unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs). Basically, a drone is a hovering mechanical device or flying robot. It 
may be remotely controlled or can fly freely through software-controlled flight plans 
embedded in their systems working together in combination with onboard sensors and 
GPS. 
In the recent past, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles were most often connected with the 
military, where they were initially used for anti-aircraft target training or practice, 
intelligence gathering and then, more controversially, as weapons stands or platforms. 
Now drones are also used in a wide range of civilian activities, ranging from search and 
rescue, traffic monitoring, surveillance, weather monitoring and firefighting to personal 
drones and business drone-based photography, as well as videography, agriculture and 
even delivery services. [70] 
Drones are used in circumstances where manned flight is considered as too 
dangerous or difficult. They provide troops with a 24-hour "eye in the sky", seven days a 
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week. Each aircraft can stay aloft for up to seventeen (17) hours at a time, moving or 
loitering over an area and sending back real-time description or imagery of events on the 
ground. [71] They are known for their “accuracy” and “stealth features”. Monumental 
tasks have been carried out with the help of drones by preventing terrorist attacks and 
capturing or arresting important Taliban leaders, including the observation or surveillance 
of the infamous and notorious “Osama Bin Laden.” [72] 
 
2.4.5 Components and operation of drones 
A typical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is made of composite materials which are not 
heavy to decrease weight and increase maneuverability. It can be equipped with a several 
diverse equipment, which may include cameras, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), GPS 
guided missiles, navigation systems, sensors or detectors, and so on. Drones can be 
controlled by remote control system or a ground cockpit. 
Drones come in various sizes, with the large drone frequently used for military 
purposes such as the Predator drone, other smaller drones which can be launched by hand, 
to other unmanned aerial vehicles which require short runways. An unmanned aerial 
vehicle system consists of two main parts, the control system and the drone itself. 
All the sensors and navigational systems are present in the nose of the unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV). The remaining part of the body is complete innovation since there 
is no loss for space to accommodate less weight and humans. The engineering materials 
used to construct the drone are very complex composites which can absorb vibration 
which minimizes the noise produced. [73] There are differences in the frame and creation 
of drones, but the crucial components that every drone must possess is a waterproof motor 
frame, flight and motor controllers, motors, transmitter and receiver, propellers, and 
batteries or any other source of energy. 
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These small aerial devices are able to pack a lot of equipment’s or accessories into 
their plastic or metal frames. Most drones are ready-to-use, however, some individuals or 
people like constructing drones by themselves using kits. 
The property that makes these unmanned aircraft extraordinary is their great flight 
capability. Drones have ultra-stable flight, and they can fly around or hover and perform 
various acrobatics in the air. How far and higher a drone can fly depends on the space you 
are flying it, and also the line of sight. A drone can certainly fly beyond the line of sight, 
but it increases the risk of hurting or causing injury to someone, crashing the drone, or 
causing damage to someone’s property. 
In terms of drones for entertainment, they have a short control distance and can fly 
for just few minutes. On the hand, advanced drones which are used in the military or 
mapping are able to fly around or hover for hours in the air and be controlled from a long 
or great distance. 
 
2.4.6 Classification of drones 
Classifying of drones may sound to be impossible, based on the fact there are 
different variety of models, with different properties or features, sizes, and price. The only 
way we can categorize them is by size. 
• Nano and mini drones 
The smallest form of drones on the planet are members of these groups. They can 
be grouped into two categories which are “Nano and Mini drones”. 
The smallest are the Nano drones which usually have the same sizes as insects but 
on the other side, mini drones can be up to 50cm in length and they have more powerful 
electric motors and better properties or features than Nano drones. 
Universally, all models from both groups are used by the military, in spying and 
smaller tasks, as a result of the fact they can be easily maneuvered and they can reach 
remote areas or locations. On the other way round, there are quite a number of models on 
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the market that are available to ordinary consumers. Nano or micro quadcopters have a 
very small radius, between 1 and 3 km and they cannot hover or fly for more than 10-20 
minutes. 
• Drones with small sizes 
Drones from this group have dimensions between 50 cm and 2 m. They don’t have 
powerful motors so they must be thrown into the air, in order to start flying. 
These products are also very popular on the market because they have great 
features and they are more affordable than bigger drones. 
These drones are also the most common type of drones available to average 
customers. Simply said, most drones that you can see on the market are members of this 
group. All of them have a radius of 5 km and they can fly between 20 and 40 minutes. 
• Drones with medium sizes 
Drones that has a wingspan between 5 and 10 m falls into the medium class or 
category. They can carry up to 200 kg of weight and they have powerful motors. 
Also, only one person cannot carry a drone from this group, so they are not a 
common choice of ordinary people. 
Medium size drones are usually used for the transportation of goods to remote 
locations, and by the military. Remember that these drones are still smaller and lighter 
than other light aircraft. They can hover up to 50 km and their hovering time can be as 
long as 6 hours. 
• Bigger drones 
Drones with a wingspan of more than 10m is a member of this category. In general, 
these drones have the same sizes as smaller aircraft and they are used by the army. A 
civilian or a normal citizen cannot buy this drone, owing to the fact it is treated as an 
aircraft. Most of these drones are equipped with weapons and missiles, so they are used 
in strategic or tactical attacks. It is believed that these big drones will entirely replace the 
aircraft that require a pilot in the near future. 
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Owing to the fact that there are different forms of drones from this group, they can 
be classified in these smaller, groups: 
• Short range models: They can hover up to 150 km and more than 11 hours. 
• Drones withy medium range: They can have a range of 650 km and they are 
usually used in weather forecasting. 
• Drones with the longest radius: Drones from this category can hover up to 
30.000 ft. above the sea level and can stay in the air for more than 36 hours. The main 
goal or objective of these drones is to reach remote distances. [74] 
 
 
Figure 2.3- Image of a drone [75] 
 
2.4.7 Drone/UAV Applications at Present and in the Future 
Drones applications are not restricted to the military world only, rather they serve 
a big part of economy with unconventional or advanced mechanisms and remarkable 
capabilities. The rising interests of users in the drone technology have established new 
fields of application for it. At present, drones are employed in so many areas and with 
continuous developments in technologies, these devices or machines are going to be more 
robust and beneficial in the near future too. They are now able to convey massive loads 
and can serve users with lengthier or longer flight times as compared to their previous 
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versions. With increasing technology, many new detectors or sensors are being added to 
drones or unmanned aerial vehicles so that their operation can be highly improved and 
they can work for dedicated applications with high level of performance. 
Drones are now employed in all fields where people use to operate; you can find 
them in agriculture industry as well as in the world of internet. Other fields where drones 
are made use of include aerial photography, search and rescue operations, shipping and 
delivery, engineering, 3D mapping, surveillance, research and nature science, etc. [76] 
 
2.4.8 Analysis of threat of UAV or drones to nuclear facilities 
The current world is rapidly changing with the advancement of new technologies 
constantly emerging and transforming methods or approaches to several tasks. 
Together with substantial benefits, many ways of using technology for malicious purposes 
have come up. 
Unmanned aircraft are not an exception to this trend. The entertaining or 
recreational and commercial use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) is on a steep 
increase. UAVs are being dynamically used for numerous recreational activities, such as 
videography, photography, and the complete enjoyment of flight. They are also becoming 
popular with commercial organizations. United States Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) 
as of January, 2016 had registered over 300,000 UAV owners in the United States. Also, 
companies and organizations, like Amazon, are looking at employing UAV technology 
for package delivery, to provide Wi-Fi services, and so on. 
UAVs are hired by civilian contractors and engineers for seismic risk assessments, 
transportation planning, disaster response, and construction management. Furthermore, in 
the nuclear industry, new uses for UAVs to fulfill or achieve operational, safety and 
environmental monitoring tasks are constantly being explored, which includes taking 
physical, chemical, and radiochemical measurements extending human safety capabilities 
by monitoring in environments where humans cannot go and, expanding the deployment 
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of traditional security detection (e.g., sensors and cameras) and perimeter monitoring 
systems. While developments in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle technology found enormous 
applications and brought numerous benefits or assistance to humanity in general, the 
possible threat of the misappropriation of this technology should not be discounted. 
Lately, the world experienced or witnessed a number of security events or 
incidents involving UAVs, some of which were related to nuclear facilities. Several 
instances of these events or incidents include: 
• Washington, D.C., in January 2015, a civilian UAV flew over the White 
House fence and crash-landed on the lawn but this incident did not cause any injuries or 
damage to property. The operator of this UAV was ‘‘an intoxicated employee of a 
government intelligence agency who was off-duty’’ and the UAV was a famous 
commercially available ‘quadcopter’. 
• The UAE, in January 2015, all air traffic at the Dubai International Airport 
was brought to a stop for 55 min by an entertaining or recreational UAV. No damages 
were caused to aircrafts or passengers, but it was a significant disruption which resulted 
in economic or financial consequences. 
• In July 2016, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles were seen hovering the over 
Savannah River Site (SRS) in the USA. In late June and early July 2016, eight (8) 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) were spotted by the protective force and professional 
staff at the facility. The event or incident prompted an investigation by federal agencies. 
The reason for the UAV flights and the identity of the operator is currently unknown at 
the time of this writing. [77] 
So many unknown drones flying over French nuclear power plants in October 
2014, have caught the attention of the general public and of authorities. These flights had 
taken place either late in the evening, during the night or early in the morning. For 
instance, on 19 October, these drones had flown over four NPPs situated far from each 
other, and on the next day over three other NPPs, signifying that this was a well-
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coordinated act. According to the media, the drones were sometimes only 20 to 30 
centimeters wide, but sometimes two meters wide and therefore could possibly carry 
smaller quantities of explosives. Even after France’s interior minister declared that special 
units of the Gendarmerie, deployed for the surveillance of NPPs since 2007, had received 
orders to “neutralize” these hovering or flying objects, anonymous drones still flew over 
French NPPs numerous times. 
A drone is an aircraft that hovers without a human pilot on board and must be 
controlled with the help of a remote from a great or far distance or programmed before it 
leaves the ground to hover one or numerous routes. 
Essentially, a drone is a reusable, unmanned carrier system that can be armed or 
equipped with weapons and sensors. 
In their military applications, drones have assumed increased importance as an 
instrument for reconnaissance and monitoring potential opponents. In that aspect, drone 
technology has made swift advancement in recent years. Till today, there has not been any 
military application of smaller, easily transportable drones with “standard” armament or 
that are equipped with, for example explosive munitions. 
Civilian mini-drones are already available for purchase in greatly varying models. 
Civilian drones are usually called “multicopters”. Though civilian drones that could 
convey quite a few kilograms of explosives are rare, they are already 
commercially available. For instance, the hexacopter, a drone with 6 arms and 12 
motors altogether, can convey and transport loads weighing up to 8kg. 
Drones also pose a danger or threat if they are used, like the military, for 
reconnaissance. Drones can send or transmit comprehensive images of an NPP’s grounds, 
its resources and the tactics or strategies used by its security forces. This might greatly 
increase the possible success of an attack and make it more “attractive” for attackers or 
terrorist group. 
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A study which was carried out in 2014 on behalf of Greenpeace Germany 
investigated whether there are possible terror incidents or scenarios supported by the 
drones that make a core meltdown almost inevitable. The purpose was not to speculate 
about who deliberately carried out the drone flyovers in France, and for what reason. 
Instead, the inquiry is on whether these drone flyovers pose a danger or threat if a terrorist 
group are responsible for them. The outcome of the study is that, contrary to what officials 
and operators state, there has been series of threats from drone flights over French nuclear 
power plants since the commencement of October 2014. Not only the drone overflights 
themselves but also the failure of security officials to explain and avert such activity are 
matters or issues for concern. 
In most times the threat of terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants (NPP) is 
deliberately played down. It is often argued that nuclear power plants are adequately 
protected but for secrecy or confidentiality reasons no details can be released or exposed. 
These arguments are opposed by the drone overflights. For one thing, it seems that 
workers or operators and officials are helpless or powerless to stop the overflights and for 
another, it must now be assumed, after potentially successful reconnaissance flights, that 
prevailing security measures or procedures are now known. [78] 
Also, more threatening, according to the telegraph reports, British Prime Minister 
David Cameron has cautioned world leaders that Islamic State terrorists are presently 
making plans to fly drones over the skies of Western countries and spray nuclear material 
in an attack. Cameron revealed his worries and concerns to other world leaders in a 
Nuclear Security Summit meeting, in which he emphasized ISIS could possibly end up 
with nuclear material in its hands. The threat, he said, was “only too real.” That threat is 
not just an outlandish imagination. Already, videotape has revealed ISIS militants or 
activist using drone technology. Combining drone technology with nuclear material is a 
frightening enough situation or scenario that world leaders are mapping out war games in 
response. [79] 
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In considering all the various instances above, it is clear that UAV tech can pose 
new threats or challenges for security and safety systems at nuclear facilities. 
 
2.4.9 Integration of Physical Protection System 
A Physical Protection System is an amalgamated system of detection, delay, and 
response measures. The Physical Protection System must be integrated and active against 
both unlawful removal and sabotage. [80] Single Physical Protection System subsystems 
may be joined and connected to each other. 
A perfect Physical Protection System design procedure takes into combination 
four disciplines which include operations, safety, physical protection, Nuclear Material 
Accounting and Control, and computer security in a well-adjusted approach to meet all 
requirements. The design process should improve the general operation of the nuclear 
facility and help meet all requirements in the most active and cost-efficient manner. 
However, each of these four disciplines has different objectives:   
• Operations: the events and systems required at the nuclear facility to attain 
or accomplish the facility mission. The aim is to accomplish the facility objectives most 
effectively and efficiently.  
• Safety: the actions and systems that protect the personnel of the facility, the 
surrounding or environment from harm or destruction caused by accident, equipment 
malfunction, and natural disasters or hazards. The aim is to make operations as safe as 
possible.   
• Nuclear Material Accounting and Control: the activities or actions and 
systems to maintain precise information on nuclear material existing at the nuclear facility. 
The main aim is to maintain knowledge of the nuclear material quantity and location, and 
to detect any unauthorized handling or movement. [81]  
• Physical protection: the events and systems that protect or prevent nuclear 
material and nuclear facilities against illegal or unlawful removal and sabotage. The main 
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aim is to protect or prevent persons, assets, society, and the public, community or 
environment from malicious acts involving nuclear material and other radioactive 
material. [82] 
 
2.5 Operations   
Operational requirements are aligned with the mission or objective of the nuclear 
facility. The requirements include work hours, number of people requiring access to 
certain locations of the facility, throughput of security area access control points, number 
and nature of entrances into a protected area such as a vital area. These requirements will 
have effect the Physical Protection System and must be considered in the design phase of 
the PPS.  
 
2.5.1 Safety   
Effectively managing the interface between safety and security is an important 
element of both programmes, to ensure appropriate physical protection of nuclear material 
and nuclear facilities and health and safety of workers and the public. [83]  
It is necessary to make sure that physical protection does not compromise safety 
and vice versa.  
One area where there is a need for close interaction between physical protection 
and safety specialists within a nuclear facility is sabotage target identification and 
subsequent protection of these targets. This must be achieved or attained using a graded 
approach, in a way which does not compromise safety requirements and arrangements but 
permits for effective protection of the targets. Every nuclear facility must perform 
analyses to:  
• Determine whether or if the radioactive fission products or materials 
(inventory) at each location inside the facility has the possibilities to result in 
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Unacceptable Radiological Consequences (URC), as determined by the State, using a 
graded approach;   
• Identify equipment, systems or devices and also the sabotage of which could 
directly or indirectly lead to Unacceptable Radiological Consequences; and   
• Identify computer-based instrument and control systems important to safety 
and security.  
Following such target identification, there is a necessity to design or upgrade the 
Physical Protection System to be more effective against credible sabotage scenarios or 
incidents derived from the applicable the Design Basis Threat (DBT) or threat assessment. 
This procedure needs to be performed every time there is an alteration in the threat 
assessment, an alteration in the State determination of URC or a significant change in the 
inventory of the facility. The procedure includes identification of vital or protected areas 
which contain radioactive material, equipment, systems and devices, and also the sabotage 
of which could lead to high radiological consequences, while taking into consideration 
engineered safety systems which are already present. [84]  
At the design stage of a facility, the amalgamation of safety and security 
requirements at the same time may allow a benefit from synergies. For example, for 
nuclear safety and security reasons, redundancy and segregation of redundant equipment 
or systems may provide benefits for safety and for safety. On the other hand, making 
provisions for redundancy only for safety reasons without providing for segregation may 
be useful for safety but not for security. The isolation of redundant equipment can also 
provide security protection against sabotage by requiring more preparation, more 
equipment and more time for an adversary to complete a malicious act. Thus, they could 
be very effective to deter, prevent or delay acts of sabotage or to mitigate or minimize the 
radiological consequences. [85] 
Other examples of safety systems that can be used to promote security are 
continuous air monitors or glove box negative pressure alarms that provide protection for 
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operator personnel, which may be used to generate alarms for potential sabotage or illegal 
removal. These safety systems could be amalgamated for safety and security protection 
by creating technical or automatic alarm communications between safety and security 
disciplines for certain operational or incidental conditions.  
The presence of radiation protection measures such as thick concrete walls or 
shielding barriers provide safety procedures for personnel and may increase adversary 
delay time to target locations.  
Nuclear power plants are generally designed and constructed to handle extreme 
external and internal loads such as vibration, heat, overpressure and impact in the interest 
of safety. IAEA guidance provides a procedure for evaluating the ability of a certain subset 
of a nuclear power plant’s safety related structures, systems and components to survive a 
sabotage induced event. [86] This guidance includes evaluation of engineered safety 
features for the protection of nuclear power stations against sabotage, including stand-off 
attacks.   
 
2.5.2 Nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC)  
At every enterprise that has nuclear materials, the accounting and control of these 
nuclear materials is an obligatory part. In the light of NM, the definition of the actual 
quantities of NM in the enterprise is understood, for which a set of measures and technical 
means is organized. The NM accounting and control system provides continuous access 
to information on the available NM quantity and location. 
A robust NMAC programme, at a nuclear power plant aids in deterring and 
detecting illegal removal of nuclear material by maintaining an inventory of all nuclear 
material and implementing control measures to maintain continuity of knowledge of the 
nuclear material and its location. It must have the ability to generate an alarm and to 
initiate a response if the system specifies that nuclear material may have been removed 
without permission or approval or is being used in an unlawful manner. An active nuclear 
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accounting and control system can detect malicious insider activity involving nuclear 
material or nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) records and support the 
correct assessment or evaluation of an irregularity involving nuclear material. [87] Hence 
it is important that the Physical Protection System and NMAC system function in a 
balanced and complementary manner in order to defeat a wide range of adversary attacks 
or threats.  
There is an IAEA guidance concerning the establishment of a nuclear material 
accounting and control system for nuclear security at a nuclear facility. [88] This guidance 
can be used to help ensure an effective interface between the facility Physical Protection 
System and the nuclear material accounting control system.   
 
2.5.3 Categorization of nuclear material  
In determining the level of physical protection to be implemented for nuclear 
materials in use and storage or during transport, account should be taken of the possibility 
that the unauthorized removal of plutonium, highly enriched uranium or uranium-233 
could lead to the construction of a nuclear explosive device by a technically competent 
group. The primary factor for determining the physical protection measures against 
unauthorized removal of nuclear material is the nuclear material itself. 
Within a nuclear facility records, the operator has to specify the material and list 
by location, the type, that is the element contained and, for uranium, the enrichment and 
composition; depending on IAEA requirements. According to IAEA document on the 
physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, the 
nuclear materials that will be present when operating NPP with VVER are: 
• plutonium  
• Uranium enriched above natural but less than 10% U-235 
• Irradiated fuel including depleted or natural uranium, thorium or low 
enriched fuel (less than 10% fissile content) 
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These nuclear materials fall under category II according to IAEA requirements 
and must be protected in agreement with careful or prudent management practice. 
[89] 
 
2.5.4 Sensitive information Protection   
Adversaries wanting to perform any malicious acts against a nuclear facility may 
gain access to important or sensitive information. Sensitive information may exist in 
various forms, including software where the unlawful disclosure, modification, alteration, 
destruction or denial of use could compromise physical protection. Prior to 
commencement of the designing a PPS, operators need to launch internal guidelines, 
policies, plans and measures for protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of the sensitive information they hold or handle, in agreement with national security policy 
and the relevant national laws and requirements. [90] 
Computer security is a vital element of Physical Protection System design and 
must be taken into consideration in design stages of the PPS. [91] 
 
2.5.5 Physical protection equipment measures   
Physical protection measures include people, procedures, and equipment. These 
measures are implemented and sustained using management systems. 
The aim, objective or goal of a Physical Protection System is to protect against 
illegal removal of nuclear material and sabotage of nuclear facilities. A Physical 
Protection System achieves these purposes using the functions of detection and 
assessment, delay, and response. [92]  
A Physical Protection System is designed to meet the fundamental principle of 
defense-in-depth by the creation of concentric security or layered security areas. The term 
‘security areas’ is used to generally to refer to limited access areas, vital areas, inner or 
protected areas and the concept of a strong room within an inner area.  
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The design of PPS is usually a difficult and complex process or task. It is advisable 
that designers create Physical Protection System design and equipment selection with 
national experts. Further support or assistance, if desired, may be gotten via bilateral 
cooperation with other States, or from the IAEA. [93] 
 
2.5.6 Risk Based Physical Protection System and Measures 
Risk management requires assessing the threat and the potential consequences of 
the malicious acts, and then developing a legislative, regulatory and programmatic 
framework which ensures that appropriate effective physical protection measures are put 
in place. 
According to IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, Nuclear Security 
Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities 
(INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), the risk of 
• unauthorized or illegal removal of nuclear materials with the intent to 
construct a nuclear explosive material 
• unauthorized removal of nuclear materials which could lead to subsequent 
dispersal and sabotage 
can be managed by: 
• Reducing the threat: The risk or threat may be reduced, for example, by the 
use of robust physical measures as deterrence, or through the confidentiality of sensitive 
information. 
• Improving the effectiveness of the physical protection system: The 
physical protection system’s effectiveness may be increased, for example, by 
implementing defense in depth or establishing nuclear security culture. 
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• Reducing the potential consequences of malicious acts: This can be 
achieved by modifying specific contributing factors, for example, the amount and type of 
nuclear material and the design of the facility. [94] 
 
2.5.7 Physical Protection Engineering and Technical Equipment (PPETF) 
Technical and engineering equipment must be included in the designing and 
creation of PPS to ensure the achievement of its objectives or goals.  
The Physical Protection Engineering and Technical Facilities must ensure:  
• consistent and nonstop operation in all operation modes stated or specified.  
• monitoring for the existence of faults or malfunctions such as loss of video 
signal, equipment rupture, attempts to access communication lines, etc. and alerting or 
sending notification to the operator about this and archiving this information. 
• remote monitoring of the operational competences or abilities of the PPETF.  
Furthermore, the physical protection engineering and technical facilities must:  
• maintain the operational capabilities during disconnection of the main power 
supply, which ought to be provided by back-up power supplies or systems and performed 
by automatic switching of the main power supply to the back-up power supply.  
• display info to the proper Local Control Unit (LCU) and Central Control Unit 
(CCU) with required registration of transfer of physical protection engineering and 
technical facilities or their components over to back-up power supply.  
Also, the complex of the physical protection engineering and technical facilities 
must carry out the following functions:  
• collection, processing, analysis and control of all signals, messages and 
information received.  
• provide the possibility of assessing an alarm situation in real time.  
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• generate and transmit of set signals or messages to the security guard and 
response units, and to command centers of the physical protection system.  
• provide information exchange between central control unit and local control 
unit.  
• develop control actions on the managed physical barriers and means on 
providing the operations of the physical protection system. 
• supervising or monitoring of the status and operational abilities of the 
physical protection engineering and technical facilities. 
• supervising the activities and location of personnel when they are working 
with nuclear materials, at nuclear installations, and at storage facilities. 
• storage and delivering information on the operation of the PPS, attempts or 
efforts to overcome it, and illegal actions against protected facilities and at the PPETF. 
The requirement and technique of information interaction of the physical 
protection engineering and technical facility complex with systems of nuclear, radiation, 
environmental, technical and fire safety of a nuclear facility must be stated in the technical 
specifications for designing and construction or improvement of the PPS.  
The physical protection technical facilities (PPTF) are elements or components 
and devices included in the following key operational or functional systems:  
• Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
• alarm system  
• Access Control System (ACS)  
• Access Monitoring Control Systems 
• Opto-Electronic Surveillance and Situation Assessment System (OESS)  
• Rapid Communication and Warning System which includes wire and radio 
communications  
• Tele-Communication System (TCS);  
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• Information Security System (ISS)  
• Power supply and lighting Systems 
 
2.5.8 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
The intrusion detection system is intended to notice efforts of illegal activities and 
must report these events or actions to the physical protection personnel and other 
functional systems within the PPS for performance of appropriate and adequate actions, 
and automatically issue the essential control commands to the activating mechanism and 
controlled physical barriers.  
 
2.5.9 Access Control Systems (ACS) 
They are designed or created for emergency call for response forces, for 
announcement about commission of unlawful actions, for issuance of signal of coercion 
on the part of the lawbreaker or intruder, for control of essential functions of the security 
guard on duty, and for control of passage of patrol along predetermined route. 
  
2.6 Access Monitoring Control Systems (AMCS) 
These are designed to control and provide access of workers or personnel to 
nuclear facility, seconded officials, visitors and passage of vehicles to rooms, buildings, 
structures, guarded areas, at the territory, and exit from them in accord with the passage 
regime established at the nuclear facility. 
 
2.6.1 Opto-Electronic Surveillance System (OESS) 
The opto-electronic surveillance system is intended for remote supervision of 
approach avenues, streets or lane to protected areas, boundaries and other perimeters in 
order to assess the current situation, monitor actions and activities of intruders, direct the 
actions of the physical protection personnel, as well as to keep a video record.  
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2.6.2 Rapid Communication and Warning System (RCWS) 
Intended or designed for the voice communication and information exchange 
among the physical protection personnel’s in order to provide controlled actions on 
protection of a nuclear facility in normal and emergency cases. 
 
2.6.3 Tele-Communication Systems (TCS) 
It is designed to provide a reliable and accurate information exchange between 
systems that are part of the physical protection system. The telecommunication systems 
must transfer precise information, provide continuousness of operations, provide 
strategically acceptable time of message or signal delivery, systematize, document and 
store information on TCS functioning, and exchange data with other components systems 
of different types of safety of the nuclear facility.  
 
2.6.4 Information Security System (ISS) 
The information security system is an essential component of an automated PPS. 
At any level of control and stages of operation of the PPS which include collection, 
transmission, processing, scrutiny, storage, and transfer of control commands, data or info 
must be protected or secured using a set of devices and implementation of procedures 
intended at preventing or avoiding leakage of information or at preventing influence on it 
via technical channels, or at prevention of unintended or intentional software and 
hardware impacts with the aim of breaching the integrity, that is, the destruction and 
distortion of information during its processing, transmission and storage, or interruption 
of the operational competence of technical equipment. 
 
2.6.5 Power Supply and Lighting Systems 
The power supply system is intended to give uninterrupted power supply to the 
engineering and technical facilities of the PPS. The power supply to the engineering and 
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technical elements must come from two different power sources backing up each other. 
Transition to backup power system have to be automatic. Information on transition of 
engineering and technical elements to back-up power must be displayed on the relevant 
local control unit and central control unit with compulsory recording. Power supply 
systems and cable networks must be protected against unofficial actions intended at 
bringing them out of operation.  
 
2.6.6 Physical barriers and engineering equipment 
Physical barriers and engineering equipment of the guarded areas and guard 
checkpoints are also included in the Physical protection engineering and technical 
facilities.  
The engineering systems must:  
• obstruct the activities of intruders or offenders when making an illegal 
intrusion. 
• create signals of impact on controlled physical barriers.  
• designate the boundaries of guarded areas. 
• protect the personnel on duty at control stations of the PPS, personnel on duty 
at check posts, duty guards at patrol posts and personnel of the security guard units in 
carrying out responsibilities on prevention of unlawful activities and detention or 
imprisonment of criminals or lawbreakers.  
Physical barriers are created to stop passage of people and automobiles into 
protected areas and also to hinder or slow down the process and actions of intruders. 
Physical barriers are engineering constructions of a nuclear facility and it includes 
walls, floors, gates, and doors. They are also specially designed and constructed structures 
which include fences, anti-ram devices, grids, reinforced doors, containers, etc. Natural 
barriers such as trees along avenues to protected areas are also considered as physical 
barriers. 
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In the event of a nuclear facility linking an area of water, actions must be taken to 
protect and fight against intrusion of offenders through the water area. This may include 
the installation of networks or other special equipment such as patrol boats if the shoreline 
makes it impossible to equip the forbidden zone. 
The fences of nuclear and storage facilities are intended to stop the passage of 
people and automobiles to and from protected areas bypassing the check posts or 
checkpoints. Fences are created along the boundary of protected zones. 
The main fence runs along the perimeter of the protected area. A forbidden zone 
must be located along the boundary of the protected area. The inner and outer fences of 
the prohibited zone pass through its borders. The fences which have been constructed must 
meet the following requirements which include: 
• the design must have no elements that make it easier to overcome barriers  
• there must be minimum number of fractures.  
 
2.6.7 Artificial Obstacles 
Artificial obstacles are devices and constructions installed or arranged in a 
protected area, on approach avenues to buildings, structures protected of protected nuclear 
installations, storage facilities in order to hinder the movement of offenders and create 
favorable conditions for their prompt detention by security guard units within the 
prohibited zone or on approach avenues to buildings and structures.  
Artificial obstacles can be permanent and portable, and used for hindering 
(slowing down) intrusion (movement) of people or vehicles.  
The design of artificial obstacles should meet the following requirements: 
• hinder the movement of offenders deeper into a nuclear facility for a time 
sufficient for his prompt detention by security guard units.  
• not interfere with normal operation of detection devices. 
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•  provide condition for the safe conduct of duties by the personnel of the 
security guard units.  
The adequacy of artificial obstacles on the perimeters of protected areas should be 
supported by calculations in evaluating the effectiveness of physical protection system 
and by the results of exercises.  
For the movement of security guard units on vehicles, roads within the territory of 
a nuclear facility, nuclear installations, storage facilities, as well as special roads (security 
guard roads) that can be built in a prohibited zone or outside depending on the width of 
the prohibited zone should be used. Security guard roads should run outside the operation 
range of detection devices and have a minimum number of intersections with roads and 
railways existing at nuclear installations and storage facilities. They should be equipped 
with signs as stipulated by road traffic regulations. Extension should be constructed on 
the road for U-turn and patrol with oncoming vehicles. Their width and installation 
frequency should be determined by local conditions. 
Warning signs with the inscription: “Prohibited zone. Passage is prohibited 
(closed)” should be installed along the obstacle line in order to warn about prohibition of 
passage to prohibited zone. In separate cases, there should be a warning sign with the 
inscription: “Passage is prohibited for unauthorized persons”. The inscription should be 
in Russian language, and in some cases – in Russian and in the respective national 
language. Warning signs should be placed on the inner and outer fences of the prohibited 
zone, using fencing poles or separate columns. Warning signs should be installed on bends 
(corners) of a prohibited zone, in wickets and gates to prohibited zones. [95] 
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3 Categorization and assessment of nuclear facility  
3.1 Design layout of nuclear facility to be used in Ghana 
Based on the threats and vulnerabilities described above, below is the hypothetical 
nuclear facility designed for the construction of NPP in Ghana.  
 
 
Figure 3.1- A hypothetical site arrangement and Layout plan for the construction 
of VVER 1000/1200 nuclear power plant in Ghana 
 
1. Transformer yard, 2. Electrical building, 3. Parking field, 4. Turbine building,  
5. Service building, 6. Radioactive waste/control building, 7. Fresh fuel building,  
8. Reactor building, 9. Diesel generator building, 10. Guard house 1,  
11. Vital area main pass/entrance, 12. Service water-pump house, 13. Circulating water-
pump house, 14. Guard house 2, 15-Cooling Towers, 16-Spent fuel pool, 17. Main office 
building, 18. Vehicle checkpoint, 19. Human checkpoint, 20. Railway spur, 21. Main 
security checkpoint, 22. Outside passive fence 
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By considering the illegal activities that goes on in Ghana and the existence of the 
terrorist organization “Boko Haram”, the main threats that may arise when operating a 
nuclear power plant will be theft of nuclear material. Other threats may include sabotage 
and terrorism. 
Based on these activities, the most vulnerable areas of this site are the nuclear 
waste and control building, spent fuel pool and the transformer yard. 
Considering the endemic corruption in Ghana, the radioactive waste and control 
building could be vulnerable due to the fact that some of the security men tasked to protect 
the stored radioactive waste from the nuclear power plant might succumb to the 
blandishments of sundry terrorist groups worldwide and give them access to the 
radioactive or nuclear waste which they are guarding. These terrorists may use the nuclear 
waste for the construction of nuclear weapons which may be used to cause mass 
destruction of the environment.  
Also, the spent fuel pool may also be vulnerable. This is because the spent fuel 
pool is more susceptible to certain terrorist attacks like deliberate aircraft crashes since it 
is located outside the reactor containment. Terrorist attack on the spent fuel pool may 
cause leakage of water from the pool and this will cause the fuel rods to heat up the 
remaining water in the pool, and finally lead to boiling and evaporation. If the water that 
leaks or boils away is not quickly replenished, the water level will drop, exposing the fuel 
rods. Once the fuel rod is exposed, it could become very hot and cause the metal cladding 
encasing the uranium fuel to rupture and catch fire, which will in turn heat up the fuel 
until it suffers damage. This kind of incident could release large quantities of radioactive 
substances into the surrounding environment. This can lead to thousands of deaths caused 
by cancer and billions of dollars in decontamination costs and economic damage. This 
would begin in current discharged spent fuel, which is hotter than fuel that has remained 
in the storage pool for a long period of time. Terrorist may attack the spent fuel pool just 
to cause fear and panic in the surrounding areas. 
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Furthermore, armed men or terrorist groups in collaboration with private 
companies which provide power to some parts of the country might sabotage the 
government by attacking power grids and other utilities which would lead to several days 
of blackout in some areas or parts of the country in order for the government to allow them 
to still operate and supply power to those areas, hence the transformer yard is also 
vulnerable. 
 
Figure 3.2- Illustration of protected, limited and vital Areas 
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3.2 The model and scenario of the offender's actions 
The intruder model is drawn up to determine the requirements for the PPS. It is a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the offender. This model 
illustrates the route that the offender will take in order to get access to the vital and other 
important areas of the facility. The offenders are expected to be many and fully armed 
hence lots security guards or forces are expected to arrive at the premises on time to 
counter the attack. 
 
 
Figure 3.3- Route of offender 
 
3.3 Equipping the checkpoint of human, transport and the protected area 
According to IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Revision 5, nuclear Security Series 
No.13 and TECDOC-1276, in the protected area, there should not be sections of 
boundaries that are not available for observation. The means of detection must be installed 
in such a way as to avoid this. The area adjacent to the border of the nuclear facility must 
be cleared of shrubs. 
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Approaches to the perimeters of the protected area and the transport checkpoint 
are equipped with detection devices, watchtowers, monitoring pit, fences, ditches, 
concrete blocks, and the road is designed in such a way that a steep turn and other options 
are provided to exclude the possibility of transport over speeding necessary for a 
breakthrough. For the location of security personnel, a room is provided for security 
personnel, which is also equipped with surveillance cameras, and alarm-ringing devices. 
Access to the premises of the protected area is possible only for individuals with a set 
password.  
In the main hall, the access of passing persons is controlled with the use of full-
height blocking-type access devices, which ensure reliable detention of persons who do 
not have access rights or who attempt to carry prohibited items. The hall is also equipped 
with optoelectronic surveillance system and body scanners with automatic alarm-ringing 
devices which helps in the detection and prevention of prohibited objects or substances 
into the premises. 
 Perimeters of the protected area are equipped with active infrared detector, bi-
static microwave detector, capacitance sensors, surveillance or video cameras and 
communication and alarming devices which are capable of providing detection of 
unauthorized access, emergency call of reaction forces and presentation of information 
for assessing the situation, as well as ditches and tongs that delay the violator or slow his 
progress. Boundaries of the protected areas are designed to provide delay long enough for 
guards to respond. 
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Figure 3.4- Human checkpoint 
1. Office of passes                                          
2. Room for personal examination                 
3. Security personnel room 2 
4. Full-height blocking-type access devices 
5. Body scanner 
6. Surveillance cameras 
7. Pin-code keyboard 
8. Security personnel room 1 
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Figure 3.5- Transport route and checkpoint 
 
1. Barriers                                                   6.  Monitoring pit 
2. Street Lights                                           7.  Watchtower 
3. Transport Entrance/Checkpoint             8. Compound Wall Lights 
4. Surveillance Cameras                             9. Facility Entrance 
5. Guard house 
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Figure 3.6- Physical protection system 
 
 
A. Off-Site                                          I. Inner Area Fence 
B. Warning Sign                                J. Field Distribution Box (FDB) 
C. Outside Passive Fence                  K. Ditch/Pit 
D. Outside Camera Tower/Light       L. Concrete Block (solid, separate) 
E. Bi-static Microwave 1                  M. Protected Area 
F. Active Infrared                             N. Inner Area Camera Tower/Light 
G. Bi-static Microwave 2                  O. Buried-line Sensor                   
H. Capacitance Sensor                      P. Tongs 
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Figure 3.7- Field Distribution Box (FDBs) showing the various components of 
the PPS 
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Financial management, resource efficiency and resource conservation.  
4.1 Financial Management. 
Financial Management refers to planning, organizing, directing and controlling the 
financial activities such as procurement and utilization of funds of an organization. It is 
the application of general management principles to financial resources of an organization. 
[96] 
4.1.1 Potential consumers of project results 
A potential consumer of PPS is any country that has NPP or an organization that 
owns Nuclear Material (NM), but for each NPP its own PPS is projected, duplication is 
excluded. Thus, in the territory of the Russian Federation, both Rosatom and private 
entrepreneurs that own NM can act as consumers. Also, through Rosatom, it is possible 
to supply a project abroad, but complete transfer of information to other states is 
prohibited. 
Also, hospitals and industries in Ghana and other countries that makes use of 
radiation can also be potential consumers of the designed PPS.  
 
4.1.2 Analysis of competitive technical solutions using QuaD technology 
Physical Protection System (PPS) can solve one important task, that is, increasing 
the level of security of most of the protected areas on the site. At the same time, security 
is provided not by only one element of the system, but by a set of organizational measures 
together with other engineering and technical facilities. 
  
4.1.3 QuaD technology 
This technology is a flexible tool for measuring the characteristics of a new 
development and its prospects in the market. For greater clarity, this analysis was carried 
out using the evaluation map presented in Table 4.1. 
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 Table 4.1 - Evaluation card for comparing competitive technical developments 
Criteria for evaluation 
 
The 
weight 
criteria 
Points 
Maximal 
score 
Relative 
Value 
(3/4) 
Weighted 
average 
value 
(3х2) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Indicators for assessing the quality of development 
1.Convenience in 
operation (meets the 
requirements of 
maintenance personnel) 
0,05 80 100 0,80 4,00 
2. Reliability 
 
0,25 90 100 0,90 22,50 
3. Safety in operation 
 
0,05 85 100 0,85 4,25 
4. Possibility of 
improvement 
 
0,12 65 100 0,65 7,80 
5. Efficiency 0,22 95 100 0,95 20,90 
6. Complexity 0,10 90 100 0,90 9,00 
7. Ability to connect to a 
computer network 
0,10 90 100 0,90 9,00 
8.Repairability 
 0,10 95 100 0,95 9,50 
Indicators for assessing the commercial development potential 
9.Product 
Competitiveness 
0,01 75 100 0,75 0,75 
Total 
 
1 1180 1500 11,80 87,70 
 
Assessment of quality and prospects for QuaD technology is determined by 
formula: 
cp = ∑ Bi .bi                                                    (4.1) 
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Where cp is the weighted average of the quality and prospects indicator scientific 
development; Bi is the weight of the indicator (in fractions of a unit); and bi is the weighted 
average of the i-th index.  
If the value of the indicator was from 100 to 80, then this development is 
considered promising. If from 79 to 60, then the prospects are above average. If from 59 
to 40, then the prospects are average. If from 39 to 20, then the prospects are below 
average. 
For the developed project, the value of the indicator is equal to 87.70, which is 
included in the range of values, which makes it possible to say that this development is 
promising. 
 
4.1.4 SWOT Analysis 
SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) is a comprehensive 
analysis of a research project. SWOT analysis is used to study the external and internal 
environment of the project. 
Strengths are factors that characterize the competitive side of a research project. 
Strengths indicate that the project has a distinctive advantage or special resources that are 
special in terms of competition. In other words, strengths are the resources or opportunities 
that project management has and that can be effectively used to achieve the goals. 
In this work, the designed system has a defense-in-depth plan which makes it 
complex thereby making it very difficult for adversary to defeat it, hence providing a 
multi-level protection for the nuclear materials or facilities. It is also designed in such a 
way that it can easily be modified or adjusted in order to fight new threats. 
Weaknesses are a shortcoming, omission or limitation of a research project that 
hinders the achievement of its objectives. This is something that is poorly achieved within 
the project or where it has insufficient capabilities or resources compared to competitors. 
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The main weaknesses of the designed system may arise from human factors such 
as employee security violations and theft by employee in collusion with outsiders. Also, 
another weakness of the system is that the modes of it operation has to be kept secret from 
some of the workers and the general public (privacy). 
 Furthermore, ageing of some equipment of the complex system such as the 
information security system (ISS) or entrusting wrong people in charge of ISS can also be 
a source of weakness. 
Opportunities include any preferable situation in the present or future that occurs 
in the environment of the project, for example, a trend, change, or perceived need that 
supports demand for project results and allows project management to improve their 
competitive position. 
The use of existing and future IAEA document (IAEA safeguards) on nuclear 
security which gives recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material, for 
example applying the rule of two or three persons in the organization can be used as a 
measure to protect nuclear materials and other vital information. This document also gives 
ways or measures on how to upgrade the PPS in order to withstand new threats. 
 Also, the concept of zones can be used as a guide when designing of PPS for use 
in nuclear facility site. The use of obstacles at the interface of security zones can be used 
as one of the protection lines when designing a security system which will prevent or delay 
unauthorized access in order to provide the security organization and authorities to 
undertake counter measures with sufficient time. 
Furthermore, by making analysis of threats that has occurred worldwide 
(International experience) from human actions will give an idea on how the system should 
be modified or adjusted in order to counter such threats in the future.  
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A threat represents any undesirable situation, trend or change in the project 
environment that is destructive or threatening for its competitiveness in the present or 
future.  
The main threats in the nuclear industry are terrorism, information leakage or loss, 
and changes of the requirement of normative legal documents. 
Some insiders may violate the security of the organization by colluding with 
outsiders (terrorist), give out passwords and other security pin codes to adversary in order 
for them to easily defeat the system and get access to vital areas such as the radioactive 
waste and control room to steal nuclear waste that they can use for nuclear weapon 
proliferation.  
The ageing of information security system can lead to breakdown of these system 
which may lead to loss of useful information of the organization. Entrusting wrong people 
in charge of information security systems can also lead to the leakage of vital information. 
The change of requirements of normative legal documents is a threat due to the 
fact that the organization may not have enough funds to modify the system anytime there 
is an upgrade or adjustment of the requirement on how to design security system based on 
new threats. 
Below are some measures that can help to reduce the threats and weaknesses of 
the designed system based on comparison of the SWOT described above. 
Adding of protection levels such as the use of biometrics as form of identification 
and access control can help to limit or control terrorist access to information systems and 
protected areas since the use of body parts is what can enable them to gain access to those 
systems and areas. 
Adaptation of all levels of protection such as upgrading or making changes in rapid 
response plan and tactics to counter new threats anytime there is a change in legal 
requirements of how to design a security system will also help to increase the security 
level in the organization. 
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Reservation of information security systems can be made in order to be able to 
recover lost information in case there is a breakdown of the old equipment. Only trusted 
people in the organization must be given the authority to have access to information 
security system. This brings about confidentiality since only authorized persons gets to 
read vital information thereby preventing the leakage of information. It also ensures that 
information and programs are changed only in a specified and authorized manner 
(Integrity).  
Table 4.2 presents the interactive project matrix, which shows the correspondence 
of strengths to capabilities, which allows for more detailed consideration of the 
development prospects. 
 Table 4.2- Interactive matrix of the project 
 S1 S2 S3 W1 W2 W3 
O1 + + - + - - 
O2 + + + - - - 
O3 - - + + - - 
T1 + + + + - - 
T2 + + + + + + 
T3 - + + - - - 
 
Based on the result of the SWOT analysis above, a final SWOT-analysis matrix is 
presented in Table 4.3. 
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 Table 4.3-SWOT Analysis 
 Strengths: 
S1- complex 
 
S2 - multi-level protection 
 
S3 - adaptability 
 
Weak sides: 
W1 - dependence on the 
human factor. 
W2 – privacy. 
W3 – Ageing of information 
security systems/ wrong in 
charge of information 
security systems  
 
Capabilities: 
O1 - IAEA safeguards 
 
O2 - Concept of zones 
and the use of zones 
within one another. 
 
O3 - use of international 
experience 
O1S1S2- Compliance 
with IAEA 
recommendations. 
 
O2S2S3- Use of obstacles 
at the interfaces of zones 
as one of the protection 
lines. 
 
O3S3- Adapt the system 
against new threats 
 
O1W1- Applying the rule of 
two or three persons. 
 
O3W1- Analysis of 
international experience for 
threats from human actions. 
 
Threats: 
T1 – Terrorism 
 
T2 – loss/ leakage of 
Information 
 
T3 - change of 
requirements of 
normative legal 
documents 
 
 
O1T2S1S2- Adding 
protection levels, 
Information control. 
 
T3S2S3- Adaptation of all 
levels of protection for 
changes. 
 
O1S3- Rapid response 
and adaptation to new 
terrorist threats. 
 
T2S3- Improvement 
 
O1W1- Biometrics 
 
T2W1W2- Control of 
access to information. 
 
T2W3. Reservation of 
information security 
systems 
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4.1.5 Evaluation of the Project Readiness for Commercialization 
 Table 4.3 - Assessment of the Readiness of the Research Project to Commercialization 
S/No Criteria Degree of 
elaboration in the 
research project 
Level of developers 
existing knowledge 
 
1 
Scientific and technical potential is 
determined. 
5 5 
 
2 
Promising areas of 
commercialization of scientific and 
technological potential are 
identified. 
 
5 
 
5 
 
3 
Industries and technologies 
(products and services) to offers on 
the market are identified. 
 
5 
 
5 
 
4 
Commodity form (product form) of 
the scientific and technical basis for 
the presentation to the market is 
determined. 
 
4 
 
4 
 
5 
Author is identified and protection of 
their rights is secured. 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
Assessment of the value of 
Intellectual Property is done. 
 
4 
 
5 
 
7 
Marketing research of potential 
markets is carried out. 
 
5 
 
5 
 
8 
Business plan for commercialization 
of scientific development is 
developed. 
 
4 
 
4 
 
9 
The ways of promoting scientific 
development to the market. 
 
5 
 
5 
 
10 
The strategy (form) the 
implementation of scientific 
development is developed. 
 
4 
 
5 
 
11 
International cooperation potential 
and access to foreign markets are 
studied. 
 
5 
 
5 
 
12 
Use of infrastructure support 
services to receive benefits is 
studied. 
 
4 
 
5 
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13 
Funding issues commercialization of 
scientific development is formed. 
 
4 
 
4 
 
14 
Team for the commercialization of 
scientific development is formed. 
 
3 
 
5 
 
15 
Arrangements for the 
implementation of a research project 
are made. 
 
3 
 
4 
16 Total points (Bsum) 64 71 
 
Readiness Assessment research project to commercialization (or the level of 
existing knowledge from the developer) is defined by the formula:  
Bsum= ∑ Bi                                                                  (4.2) 
where Bsum is the total number of points in each direction; and Bi is the point on 
the i-th indicator. 
The value of Bsum suggests the extent of readiness of scientific development and 
its developer to commercialization. For example, if the value of Bsum turned out between 
75 and 60, such a development is considered promising, and the developer of knowledge 
sufficient for successful commercialization. If 59 to 45, it means that the prospect is above 
average. If 44 to 30, it means average prospect. If 29 to 15, it means that the prospect is 
lower than average. If 14 and below, it means the prospect is extremely low. 
Hence the evaluation concludes that the volume of investment in the ongoing 
development and direction of further development is considered promising, and developer 
of knowledge sufficient for successful commercialization. 
 
4.1.6 Planning for the management of the scientific and technical project 
The organizational structure of the project is the most appropriate a temporary 
organizational structure that includes all its participants and is created to successfully 
achieve the project's objectives. 
Development of the organizational structure of the project includes: 
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• Identification of all organizational units 
• Defining the roles of project participants and their interaction, 
• Definition of responsibility and authority 
• Distribution of responsibility and authority between organizational units of 
the structure 
• Development of instructions regulating interactions in the structure and 
working procedures. 
The organizational structure of the project is a dynamic structure, which is 
undergoing changes in the project implementation process. These changes depend on the 
phases of the life cycle of the project, the types used in project contracts, and other 
conditions for the implementation of the project.  
The Project stakeholders and Participants include: 
• Research Institute (Performer: Heads, Supervisors and Students) 
• Business company dealing with radiation monitoring and Nuclear fuel use 
activities (Head of Company, Engineers and Consultants) 
• Educational Institutions (Head, Engineers and Consultants) 
 
4.1.7 Structure of work under the project 
In the process of creating the hierarchical structure of the project, the content of 
the entire project is structured and defined. The planning process group consists of the 
processes performed to determine the overall content of the work, clarify the objectives 
and develop the sequence of actions required to achieve these goals. Work breakdown 
Structure (WBS) - detailing of the enlarged work structure: the division of the entire 
volume of the planned work into small operations so that they correspond to the level at 
which the way of performing the planned actions would be clear, and the operations would 
be evaluated and planned 
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Table 4.4- Morphological matrix for research implementation alternatives 
Characteristics Alternatives 
 1 2         3 
Entity University Research Institute Business Company 
Executives Supervisor Head of institute Head of Company 
Materials Free Bought Bought 
Equipment Free Bought Rented 
Software General Special Special 
Software access Free Free Free 
Facilities Classroom Lab Office 
Facilities access Free Bought Rented 
 
4.1.8 Project plan 
As part of the planning of the research project, a calendar schedule was 
constructed. In this case the Gantt chart was used to map the distribution of the work 
carried out.  Gantt chart is a type of bar charts which is used to illustrate the planned 
schedule of project, in which the works can be shown the extensive length of time, 
characterized by the dates of beginning and end of the implementation of these works. 
The graph is constructed and shown in table 4.5 below by month and seven-day 
working periods during run-time of project. The difference in the length of the distribution 
of each working period largely depends on the task needed for a particular work. The task 
performed are written and shown in appendix. The work on the topic is represented by 
long stretches of time, characterized by the dates of commencement and completion of 
work. The linear graph is presented in Table 4.6. 
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 Table 4.5- Stages of work and executors 
Main stages Duration, 
days 
Work content Position performer 
Development 
of technical 
specifications 
3 Drafting and approval of 
technical specifications 
 
 Supervisor 
Choice of 
direction 
research 
 
 
90 Selection and study of materials 
on the topic 
Engineer 
 
 
90 Conducting patent research Engineer 
 
5 Choice of Research Directions Supervisor 
 
Engineer 
5 Scheduling of work on the topic Supervisor 
 
Engineer 
Theoretical 
research 
 
5 Consideration of similar crimes 
 
 
Engineer 
 
5 Selection of Physical protection 
engineering and technical 
equipment, Categorization of 
nuclear facility 
Supervisor 
 
Engineer 
10 Conducting a vulnerability 
Analysis 
Engineer 
15 MC & A organization Engineer 
 
Carrying out of modeling  
Development 
of technical 
documentation 
and design 
15 Drawing up the plan of the 
object 
Supervisor 
 
Engineer 
 
20 
Designing of PPS and 
calculation of PPS effectiveness 
Supervisor 
 
Engineer 
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 Table 4.6 - Work schedule 
wor
k 
Nu
mb
er 
  
Type of work  
 
Performer
s  
 
Тк,  
cal, 
da
ys.  
Duration of work execution 
 
Feb March  April May June 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1 Drafting and 
approval of 
technical 
specifications 
 
Supervisor  
 
3 
               
2 Selection and 
study of 
materials on the 
topic 
 
 
Engineer  
 
90 
               
3 Conducting 
patent research 
 
 
Engineer  
 
90 
               
4 Choice of 
Research 
Directions 
 
Supervisor 
 
Engineer  
5 
 
5 
   
 
           
5 Scheduling of 
work on the 
topic 
Supervisor 
 
 Engineer  
5 
 
5 
    
 
          
6 Consideration 
of similar 
crimes 
 
Engineer  
  
 
10 
    
 
          
7 Selection of 
Physical 
protection 
engineering and 
technical 
equipment, 
Categorization 
of nuclear 
facility 
 
Supervisor 
 
Engineer  
 
15 
 
15 
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8 Conducting a 
vulnerability 
analysis 
 
Engineer  
 
10 
      
 
        
9 MC & A 
organization 
 
 
 
 
Engineer  
 
 
5 
        
 
      
10 Drawing up the 
plan of the 
object 
 
Supervisor 
 
Engineer 
15 
 
15 
        
 
      
11 Designing of 
PPS and 
calculation of its 
effectiveness 
Supervisor 
 
Engineer 
20 
 
20 
         
 
     
 
 
Supervisor 
 
Engineer 
 
4.1.9 Budget of scientific research  
When planning the research budget, it must be ensured that full and reliable 
reflection of all types of costs associated with its implementation. In the process of budget 
formation, cost like material costs, costs for special equipment for scientific work, 
additional salaries among others were calculated. The scientific work was carried out 
under a budget allocated to a supervisor and one student of the university. The supervisor 
is allocated 300 Rub per hour and the engineer has 100 Rub per hour. The total cost 
incurred during the cost of the project was then calculated and shown below. The main 
costs in this research are costs for electricity and purchase of office supplies. The cost of 
electricity is calculated by the formula: 
C = Tel ∙ P ∙ t = 6 ∙ 0.5 ∙ 600 = 1800                                               (4.3) 
where Tel - tariff for industrial electricity (6 rubles per 1 kW · h); 
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Р - capacity of equipment, kW; 
t - time of use of equipment, h (120×5). 
The cost of electricity amounted to 1800 ruble 
 
4.2 Raw materials, purchased products and semi-finished products 
This item includes the cost of all kinds of purchasing materials, components and 
semi-finished products necessary for the implementation of works on the subject. Number 
of required material values determined by the norms of consumption. 
Material cost calculation is carried out according to the following formula: 
                                                (4.4) 
Where m – number of types of material resources consumed in carrying out 
scientific research; 
Ni – the number of physical resources i-th species, planned to be used in carrying 
out scientific research (pieces, kg, m, mon.); 
Pi– acquisition unit price i-th species consumable material resources (rubles / pc, 
rub / kg, rub / m, rub / m etc.....); 
Ktr– coefficient taking into account transportation and procurement costs. 
Calculating the expenses of material costs based on the current price list or 
negotiated prices. The expenses of material costs include transportation and procurement 
costs (15-25% of the price). In the same item, includes the expenses of paperwork 
(stationery, copying materials). The results of this term are presented in the Table 4.7 
below.  
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Table 4.7 - Raw materials, components and semi-finished products 
Title 
unit 
Quantity 
Price per each, 
ruble 
The sum, ruble 
Atl 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 
Atl 
1 
Alt 
2 
Alt 
3 
Atl 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 
Electricity - 
600 
kW° ּhr 
620 
kW° ּhr 
640 
kW° ּhr 
6 6 6 1800 3100 3120 
Paper SvetoCopy 
1 
packet 
of 500 
sheets 
1 
packet 
of 500 
sheets 
1 
packet 
of 500 
sheets 
0.54 0.54 0.54 270 270 270 
Printing - 400 420 430 2 2 2 800 840 860 
Pen Stabilo 4 4 4 30 30 30 120 120 120 
Access to 
the 
Internet 
- 
4 
months 
4 
months 
4 
months 
350 350 350 1400 1400 1400 
Total of materials 4390 5730 5770 
Transportation and procurement expenses (15%) 659 860 866 
Total items См 5049 6590 6636 
 
4.2.1 Calculation of costs for special equipment for scientific  
This item includes all costs associated with the acquisition of special equipment 
necessary for work on specific topic. In this research work on special equipment, 
necessary for carrying out experimental work is a personal computer which costs 26,000 
rubles, with a life service of 4 years. 
Table 4.8 - Budget cost for the purchase of special equipment for scientific paper 
# 
Name of 
equipment 
Number of units of 
equipment 
unit price of 
equipment, ths. Rub. 
The total cost of 
equipment, ths. Rub. 
Atl 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 Atl 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 Atl 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 
1 computer 1 1 1 26000 36000 40000 26000 36000 40000 
Total: 26000 36000 40000 
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4.2.2 The basic salary of the performers of the topic 
The article includes the basic wages of employees, directly involved in the 
implementation of the project (including bonuses, co-payments) and additional wages. 
The item includes basic wages of workers directly involved in the implementation 
of the project (including premiums, bonuses) and additional wages. 
Table 4.9 – Calculation of basic salary 
# 
Executives 
 
Work, person-
days. 
Salaries per one 
person-days, ths. 
Rub. 
Total salaries at the rate 
(salary), ths. Rub. 
Atl 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 Atl 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 Atl 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 
1 supervisor 36 - - 2760 - - 99360 - - 
2 Head of Lab - 42 - - 3680 - - 154560 - 
3 Research Director - - 48 - - 4600 - - 220800 
4 student 120 - - 920 - - 110400 -  
5 Specialist - 50 - - 2760 - - 138000 - 
6 Engineer - - 70 - - 1840 - - 128800 
Total 209760 292560 349600 
 
 
4.2.3 The main salary of the performers of the topic 
The article includes the basic wages of employees, directly involved in the 
implementation of the project (including bonuses, co-payments) and additional wages. 
The item includes basic wages of workers directly involved in the implementation 
of the project (including premiums, bonuses) and additional wages.  
                          𝑆𝑡=𝑆𝑏+𝑆𝑎𝑑                                                                 (4.5) 
where 𝑆𝑏 – basic salary; 
𝑆𝑎𝑑 – additional salary. 
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Basic salary can be calculated, based on hourly labor rates: 
             𝑆𝑏=𝑆ℎ∗8                                                                     (4.6) 
where 𝑆ℎ - basic salary of one employee per hour, rub/hour; Hourly labor rate may 
vary depending on the type of executive in the research project. 
 
4.2.4 Additional salary of performers of the topic 
Costs for additional pay for the performers of the topic allowance for the amount 
of additional payments foreseen in the Labor Code of the Russian Federation for deviation 
from normal working conditions, as well as payments related to guarantees and 
compensation. 
The additional salary is calculated on the basis of 10-15% of basic salaries of 
employees directly involved in implementation of the topic: 
Calculation additional salary conducted according to the following formula: 
𝑆𝑎𝑑 = 𝑘𝑎𝑑∗𝑆𝑏                                                                       (4.7) 
where 𝑘𝑎𝑑 - factor of additional salary (taken at the design stage at 0.12 - 0.15). 
We take the coefficient of additional salary equal to 0.15 for the supervisors while 
0.12 for an engineer, student and specialist. The results of calculating the main and 
additional wages of performers of scientific research are presented in Table 4.10. 
 
4.2.5 Contributions to social funds (insurance contributions) 
In Russian Federation, employees pay insurance payments for state social 
insurance fund (SIF), the Pension Fund (PF) and medical insurance fund (MIF). 
Employers on behalf of the employees make these payments. Contributions to these funds 
determined based on the following formula:  
𝑆𝑓 = 𝑘𝑓∗(𝑆𝑏+ 𝑆𝑎𝑑)                                                       (4.8) 
where 𝑘𝑓 - coefficient for payments to funds (SIF, PF, MIF). 
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In 2018 the size of insurance payments was set at the level of 30%. Yet for 
institutions engaged in educational and scientific activity the reduced rate of 27,1% is 
used. Social funds contributions have been calculated and tabulated in Table 4.10  
 Table 4.10 Contributions to social funds  
Artist  basic salary, rubles. Additional salary, rubles. 
Alt.1 Alt.2 Alt.3 Alt.1 Alt.2 Alt.3 
Supervisor 2400   360   
Head of Lab  3200   480  
Research Director   4000   600 
Student 800   120   
Specialist  2400   360  
Engineer   1600   240 
Ratio of 
contributions to 
social funds 
 
27,1% 
 
27,1% 
 
30% 
 
27,1% 
 
27,1% 
 
30% 
Total amount of social fund payments 
Alternative 1 997 
Alternative 2 1745 
Alternative 3 1932 
 
4.2.6 Overhead costs 
This article includes the costs of management and maintenance, which can be 
attributed directly to a particular topic. In addition, this includes expenses for the 
maintenance, operation and repair of equipment, production tools and equipment, 
buildings, structures, etc. The calculation of overhead costs is carried out according to the 
following formula: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣ℎ = 𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙∗𝑘𝑜𝑣ℎ                                              (4.9) 
Where 𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 – Total costs of the above cost items in 1 – 7 and 
𝑘𝑜𝑣ℎ – Overhead coefficient, which can be taken at a rate of 16%. 
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Table 4.11 - Overhead Expenses 
 Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 
Ctotal 241806 336895 398168 
Kovh 38689 53903 63707 
 
The calculated value of the costs of research work is the basis for the formation 
of the project cost budget, which, when forming an agreement with the customer, is 
protected by a scientific organization as the lower limit of the cost of developing 
scientific and technical products. 
The definition of the cost budget for a research project for each option is shown in 
Table 4.12. 
  Table 4.12 – Calculation of the expenditure budget of the research project  
S.No Name of the item Amount, Rubles 
Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 
1 Material costs of the 
study  
5049 6590 6636 
2 Expenses for special 
equipment  
26000 36000 40000 
3 Costs for the salaries of 
the performers of the 
topic  
209760 292560 349600 
4 Contributions to social 
funds 
 
997 
 
1745 
 
1932 
5 Overhead expenses 38689 53903 63707 
6 Research Cost Budget 280495 390798 461874 
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4.2.7 Effectiveness and efficiency of resources 
The definition of efficiency is based on the calculation integral indicator of the 
effectiveness of the scientific research and this can be related to the definition of two 
weighted averages; financial efficiency and resource efficiency. 
Integral component cost-effectiveness research obtained during budget cost 
estimates three (or more) variants of scientific studies (see Table 4.13). To do this, the 
most integral indicator of the implementation of the technical problem is taken for the 
calculation base (the denominator), which relates to the financial value of all the 
embodiments. 
Integral financial efficiency indicator development is defined as:  
                                                         (4.10) 
where  – an integral index of financial efficiency;  
𝑇𝐶𝑖 – Total cost of the i-th alternative;  
𝑇𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 – the maximum total cost of research project (including analogs). 
The obtained value of the integral financial indicator of the development reflects 
the corresponding numerical increase in the development costs budget in times (value 
greater than one), or the corresponding numerical reduction in the cost of development in 
times (the value is less than one, but greater than zero). 
Since the development has one execution, then; 
 
 
For analogues respectively: 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑛
𝑎𝑙𝑡 .1 =  
𝑇𝐶1
𝑇𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
=
280495
461874
= 0,61 
𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑛
𝑎𝑙𝑡 .2 =  
𝑇𝐶2
𝑇𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
=
390798
461874
= 0,85 
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Integral resource-efficiency indicator of research alternatives can be determined 
as follows: 
                                                       (4.11) 
Where – an integral indicator resource for i-th embodiment of the 
development; 
 𝑎𝑖 – weight factor of i-th research alternative; 
 𝑏𝑖 – a score of i-th execution of development options is set by an expert in the 
chosen scale of assessment;  
n – number of parameters comparison. Calculation of the integral indicator 
resource is recommended in tabular form (Table 4.13). 
 Table 4.13 - Comparative evaluation of characteristics of the project alternatives 
Criteria Weighting 
coefficient of the 
parameter ai 
 
bi  Score 
Alt.1 Alt.2 Alt.3 
1. Convenience in 
operation (meets the 
requirements of 
maintenance personnel) 
0,05 3 3 5 
2. Reliability 
 
0,25 5 4 4 
3. Safety in operation 
 
0,05 4 5 4 
4. Possibility of 
improvement 
 
0,12 4 5 5 
5. Efficiency 
 
0,22 4 5 4 
6. Complexity 
 
0,10 4 5 4 
𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑛
𝑎𝑙𝑡 .2 =  
𝑇𝐶2
𝑇𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
=
461874
461874
= 1 
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7. Ability to connect to a 
computer network 
 
0,10 4 5 5 
8. Repairability 
 
0,10 3 4 4 
9. Product 
Competitiveness 
0,01 4 5 5 
Total 1    
 
Alt.1 = 0,05*3+0,25*5+0,05*4+0,12*4+0,22*4+0,1*4+0,1*4+0,1*3+0,01*4=4,50 
Alt.2= 0,05*3+0,25*4+0,05*5+0,12*5+0,22*5+0,1*5+0,1*5+0,1*4+0,01*5=4,55 
Alt.3 = 0,05*5+0,25*4+0,05*4+0,12*5+0,22*4+0,1*4+0,1*5+0,1*4+0,01*5=4,28 
Integral total efficiency indicator of alternatives is determined based on the 
integral resource and financial efficiency by formula: 
                                                            (4.12) 
Hence 
=  = 
4,50
0,61 
 = 7,38; =  = 
4,55
0,85 
 = 5,35; =  = 
4,28
1
 = 4,28 
 
Comparison of the integrated indicator of the effectiveness of the current project 
and its analogues will determine the comparative effectiveness of the project. Comparative 
efficiency of the project: 
                                                        (4.13) 
The result of calculating the comparative efficiency of the project and the 
comparative effectiveness of the analysis are presented in Table 4.14. 
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Table 4.14 Comparative development effectiveness 
№  
p / p  
Indicators Alt.1 Alt.2 Alt.3 
1 Integral financial efficiency indicator  0,61 0,85 1,00 
2 Integral resource-efficiency indicator  4,50 4,55 4,28 
3 Integral total efficiency indicator  7,38 5,35 4,28 
4  Comparative project efficiency indicator  1,72 1,25 1,00 
 
Comparison of the values of integral performance enables to understand and select 
most effective alternative for solution of the technical problem in the research taking into 
account financial and resource efficiency. Therefore, Alternative one is proved to be more 
efficient compared to the other two alternatives. 
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Social Responsibility 
The creation and implementation of an integrated Occupational Safety and Health 
(OSH) management system is an integral part of the successful conduct of preventive 
work to reduce the level of injuries in the workplace and reduce the percentage of 
occupational morbidity. This system is implemented at all stages of the production process 
by creating a unified system of targeted actions by combining all ongoing measures for 
labor protection. 
Occupational safety is a system of socio-economic, legislative, therapeutic and 
preventive and other measures and means that ensure the preservation of health, safety 
and human health in the work process. 
In order to develop a safe working environment and avert accidents of people 
during process of work, rules are introduced for occupational safety and health, which are 
obligatory for engineering and technical workers, employees and supervisors. 
A dangerous factor or industrial hazard is a factor whose impact under certain 
conditions leads to trauma or other sudden, severe deterioration of health of the worker 
[97]. 
A harmful factor or industrial health hazard is a factor, the effect of which on a 
worker under certain conditions leads to a disease or a decrease in working capacity. 
 
5.1 Harmful and hazardous production factors Analysis 
It is necessary to take into account the dangerous production factors (DPF) and 
harmful production factors (HPF), which arise when working on a computer. Identified 
DPF and HPFF are presented in Table 5.1. It should be noted that under the conditions in 
which the work was carried out, there is no influence of DPF. 
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 Table 5.1 - The main elements of the production process, forming DPF and HPF 
Name of work 
types and 
parameters of the 
production process 
 
Factors in accordance 
with GOST 12.0.003-74 SSBT 
 
Regulations 
 
Harmful 
 
Dangerous 
 
 
Work on a 
computer  
The impact of 
radiation 
(microwave, 
UHF, VHF, 
HF, etc.) 
 
– SanPIN 2.2.2 / 2.4.1340-03 Sanitary-
epidemiological rules and regulations. 
"Hygienic requirements for PC and 
organization of work" 
 
– Electricity 
 
GOST 12.1.038-82 SSBT. Electrical 
safety 
 
–  
Fire safety 
 
GOST 12.1.004-91 SSBT.  
Fire safety.  
 
 
5.1.1 Organizational arrangements for work on a computer 
All personnel’s working on a computer must strictly observe the safety rules. 
Training of personnel of safety and industrial sanitation involve induction training and 
Education at the workplace, conducted by the responsible person. 
Testing of knowledge of safety rules by the qualification commission is conducted 
by personnel after training at the workplace. 
Persons engaged in servicing the electrical installation should not have bruises or 
injuries, medical contraindications that interfere with production work. The medical 
examination determines the health status of persons engaged in the production process. 
 
5.1.2 Technical measures 
The workplace must be planned in such a way that a clear order is provided, items, 
tools and documentation must have a permanent placement. Objects necessary for the 
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performance of work must be placed in the easy reach of the workplace as shown in figure 
below. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 - Hand reach zones in the horizontal plane 
a. Zone of maximum reach of hands; 
b. reach zone of fingers with outstretched arm; 
c. easy reach zone of the palm; 
d. Optimum space for fine handmade work 
e. the optimum space for rough manual work 
 
The optimal placement of objects of labor and documentation in the reach of hands 
are described below. 
• the display is located in zone a (in the center) 
• keyboard - in the area of e / d 
• the system unit is located in zone b (on the left) 
• the printer is in zone a (right) 
The documentation is placed in the easy reach of the palm - in (left) - literature 
and documentation necessary for work; In the drawers of the table - literature that is not 
used constantly. 
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The desk for writing should be designed taking into account the following 
requirements: 
• The height of Working table is 680-800 mm; 
• Working table width is not less than 700 mm and the length is not less than 1400 
mm. 
• the height of the legroom is not less than 600 mm, the width is not less than 500 
mm, the depth at the level of the knees is not less than 650 mm. 
• The work chair must be chosen in such a way that it is up and down and that it is 
possible to adjust the height and angle of the seat and backrest.  
• The recommended seat height is (420-550 mm) above the floor. The width and 
depth of the seat surface should be at least 400 mm, and the seat surface should be with a 
recessed front edge. 
• The computer monitor should be located at the eye level of the operator at a distance 
of (500-600) mm.  
• The level of contrast and brightness of the image on the screen should be chosen in 
such a way as to reduce the irritating effect on the visual apparatus of the operator. Also, 
for convenience and compliance, when selecting a computer, it should be possible to 
adjust the position of the screen. 
• The keyboard should be located on the surface of the table at a distance from the 
edge of 100-300 mm. The normal position of the keyboard for work is its placement at the 
level of the operator's elbow with an angle of inclination to the horizontal plane of 15 
degrees. The most convenient for work are keys having a concave surface, a quadrangular 
shape with rounded corners. The keyboard should be chosen so that the color of the keys 
is contrasted with the color of the panel. 
• At work, which requires intensive mental or physical tension, shades of warm 
tones that excite human activity are recommended. 
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5.1.3 Safe working conditions 
The main parameters that characterize working conditions are noise, microclimate, 
electromagnetic field, vibration, illumination, radiation. 
The creation of a microclimate (air in the workplace) of industrial premises is 
based on parameters such as temperature, air speed and relative humidity. 
The optimal and permissible values of the microclimate characteristics are given 
in Table 5.2. 
 Table 5.2- Optimal and permissible parameters of the microclimate 
Period of the year 
 
Тtemperature, °С Relative humidity 
(%) 
Air 
velocity, m/s 
Cold and 
Transitional 
 
23-25 40-60 0,1 
Warm 23-25 40 0,1 
 
Among the activities for the improvement of air quality in the workplace include: 
proper organization of ventilation and air conditioning and heating facilities. Ventilation 
can be in the form of natural and mechanical means. The rooms of the premises or 
buildings must have the following amounts of outside air: the volume of the room must 
be up to 20 m3 per person or not less than 30 m3 per hour per person; when the volume of 
the room is more than 40 m3 per person and there is no emission of harmful substances, 
there shall be natural ventilation. 
The heating system must provide adequate, consistent and uniform heating of the 
air. In areas with high demands for clean air must use water heating system. Parameters 
used in the climate laboratory governed by a central heating system and have the following 
meanings: humidity of 40%, air velocity of 0.1 m / s, and temperatures in the summer of 
20-25 ° C, winter temperature is 13-15 ° C. The laboratory uses natural ventilation. The 
air enters and leaves through the slits, the windows, the doors. The main problem of such 
a ventilation that supply air enters the room without purification and heating. 
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In the course of work, harmful and disturbing factors can include vibration, noise, 
and other worsening working conditions which have a harmful effect on the human body 
and on the hearing organs through the central nervous system. 
Due to this, the response is reduced, attention is weakened, the number of errors 
increases, and memory deteriorates. The noise level at the workplace when working on a 
PC should not exceed 50 decibel (dB). in the frequency range 2 kHz - 400 kHz - 25 nT. 
System units and the computer screen produce EMR. The main sources of 
radiation are the system unit and video cable. According to [98], the intensity of the 
electromagnetic field at a distance of 50 cm around the screen along the electrical 
component should be no more than: 
• in the frequency range 5 Hz - 2 kHz - 25 V / m 
• in the frequency range 2 kHz - 400 kHz - 2.5 V / m 
The magnetic flux density should be no more than: 
• in the frequency range 5 Hz - 2 kHz - 250 nT 
To protect against EMR, you need: 
• Increase the distance from the operator to the source (the screen should be at 
least 50 cm from the user) 
• apply screen filters, special screens and other PPE, i.e. the use of pre-screen 
filters, special screens and other personal protective equipment. 
Computer screens or display produces non-ionising Radiation. Under the influence 
of non-ionising radiation in the body, various biological effects and complications can 
arise, which may include violations of normal blood coagulability, radiation sickness, etc. 
The irradiation dose of the operator at a distance of 20 cm to the display is 50 microR/ 
hour. According to the norms [98], the design of the computer produces radiation, the 
equivalent dose of which is equal to 100 μR / h. 
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Weakness of the organs of vision can be caused by factors such as insufficient 
lighting or illumination, excessive lighting and wrong direction of light. 
 
5.1.4 Electrical safety 
The risk of associated with electric shock to a person can be maximize or 
minimize, depending on the conditions provided in the room. Work with computers in 
high humidity, high temperature (more than 35 ° C), the presence of conductive dust, 
conductive floors should not be. 
When working on a computer, there is a danger of electro-impact when touching 
non-conductive parts, when touching the floor, walls exposed to voltage, with a short 
circuit in the power supply. 
The actions to ensure the electrical safety of electrical installations include: 
• disconnection of voltage from current-carrying parts, on which or near which work 
will be carried out; 
• preparation and posting of posters that indicate the place of work; 
• earthing of the housings of all installations; 
• covering the conductive surfaces of tools with reliable insulation  
• inaccessibility of current-carrying parts of equipment (the conclusion in the case 
of electroporating elements, the conclusion in the body of current-carrying parts) [99] 
 
5.1.5 Fire and Explosive Safety 
According to [100], depending on the characteristics or features of the substances 
used in the production, and their quantity, for fire and explosion hazard, the premises can 
be characterized by categories A, B, C, D. As the room is classified in category B 
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according to the degree of fire and danger (room with solid combustible substances), it is 
essential to provide for a number of preventive measures. Possible causes of fire can be: 
• malfunction of current-carrying parts; 
• work with open electrical equipment; 
• short circuits in the power supply; 
• Failure to comply with fire safety regulations, etc. 
Fire prevention actions are classified into regime, organizational, operational and 
technical. 
Organizational procedures comprise of proper maintenance of buildings and 
territories, operation of equipment, firefighting of workers, training of personnel in fire 
safety rules, etc. 
Technical measures usually include compliance with fire regulations and rules for 
the construction and design of buildings electrical wires and equipment, heating, 
ventilation, lighting, etc. 
Technical procedures or measures usually include compliance with fire 
regulations and rules for the construction and design of buildings electrical wires and 
equipment, heating, ventilation, lighting, etc. 
The regime measures can be attributed to fire prevention measures and the 
establishment of rules for the organization of work. To avert the occurrence of fire from 
short circuits, overloads, etc. It is obligatory to follow the fire safety rules described above. 
In the event of an emergency, it is necessary: 
• notify the management (duty officer); 
• Call the appropriate emergency service or Emergency Situations Ministry at 112 
• take measures to eliminate the accident in accordance with the instructions.  
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Conclusion 
The dissertation was done in a period of four (4) months with the help of a 
scientific advisor.  
During the performance of the final qualification work, the plans for the 
implementation of nuclear program in Ghana was considered. From the analysis 
conducted on places to build NPP, Kpong was chosen to be the best site to build NPP in 
Ghana.  
Also, based on the threat and vulnerability analysis conducted, it was realized that 
the main threat is unauthorized removal or theft of nuclear material due to the existence 
of armed robbers and terrorist organization “Boko Haram” with trained armed forces and 
may try to obtain nuclear materials. Nuclear material of VVER-type NPP may be 
attractive for the terrorist groups because it can be used to produce nuclear and 
radiological weapons. Moreover, spent nuclear fuel contains plutonium. 
Hence, the physical protection system and the boundaries of protected areas were 
designed according to international and local legal framework (IAEA, DOE, ROSATOM) 
to provide delay long enough for guard’s forces to respond.  
The budget spent for the project implementation is 280494.70 rubles. 
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